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In this commentary, I propose a strategy for extending Evan Thompson’s argument
on the existence of dreamless sleep experience. My first aim is to show that the
Indian debate on reports of having slept peacefully is importantly similar to de-
bates in scientific dream research and contemporary Western philosophy on the
trustworthiness of dream reports. This analogy leads to a surprising conclusion:
the default view of conscious experience as that which disappears in dreamless
sleep, though widely accepted in cognitive neuroscience, is in fact inconsistent
with the methodological background assumptions of scientific dream research. Im-
portantly, the methods already used in scientific dream research, as well as the
theoretical justification on which they are based, can be extended to the investig-
ation of dreamless sleep experience. Second, I sketch the outlines of a conceptual
model of dreamless sleep experience as involving pure subjective temporality, or
phenomenal experience characterized only by the phenomenal now and the sense
of duration, but devoid of any further intentional content. I suggest that under-
stood in this manner, dreamless sleep experience is a candidate for minimal phe-
nomenal experience, or the simplest form in which a state can be phenomenally
conscious. This model also extends existing work on minimal phenomenal selfhood
in dreams. Third, I discuss three empirical examples that I take to be particularly
promising candidates of dreamless sleep experience. These are certain forms of
minimal or imageless lucid dreams, white dreams, and sleep-state misperception
of the type most dramatically seen in subjective insomnia. 
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1 Introduction 
The  default  view  in  philosophy  of  mind  and
cognitive neuroscience has long been that  the
very notion of phenomenal experience occurring
during  dreamless  sleep  is  nonsensical  and  in-
volves a conceptual contradiction.1 In this view,
consciousness  is  „that  which  disappears  in
dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake up
or dream” (Thompson 2015, this collection, p.
1), and dreamless sleep is simply characterized
by the absence of conscious experience.2 In his
target article, Evan Thompson casts doubt on
this view. Drawing from classical Indian philo-
sophy as well as evidence from sleep and dream
research, he argues that dreamless sleep experi-
ence is a theoretically coherent and empirically
tractable target for future research. Yet, in or-
der to even begin to make sense of dreamless
sleep experience, a more fine-grained taxonomy
1 In some readings of the term dreamless sleep, the default view in not
just obviously false, but it is also unclear that it is actually endorsed
by many researchers working on dreaming and sleep. Most would ac-
knowledge, for instance, that hypnagogic imagery during sleep onset
or repetitive and non-progressive types of sleep thinking involve phe-
nomenal experience  during sleep;  yet,  because they are  also com-
monly distinguished from full-fledged dreaming, they can be said to
occur in dreamless sleep. This, however, is different from the type of
dreamless sleep experience that  Evan Thompson has in mind and
that is the focus of this commentary. As will become clear later, in
the  narrower  reading  endorsed  by  Thompson,  dreamless  sleep  “is
that sleep state in which there are no sensory or mental objects of
awareness, that is, no images and no thoughts” (p. 14); the question,
denied by the default view, is whether this state of sleep can some-
times involve phenomenal experience. Dreamless sleep experience of
this type, if it exists, is also distinct from experiences occurring dur-
ing sleep-wake transitions in that it is thought to occur during deep
sleep. In the context of this commentary, I will always, unless expli-
citly noted otherwise, use the term dreamless sleep experience in this
narrow sense. In other readings, the default view may be thought to
be trivially true: if one defines dreams as involving any kind of phe-
nomenal experience during sleep (Flanagan 2001), then the occur-
rence  of  phenomenal  experience  during  dreamless  sleep  is  indeed
ruled out by conceptual considerations. This reading, however, is too
permissive in that it fails to acknowledge the distinction between dif-
ferent types of experiences occurring during sleep, ranging from ima-
gistic, narratively complex, and often emotional dreams to thought-
like  activity.  For  now,  this  suggests  that  the  default  view is  too
simple:  the  question  is  not  whether  there  are  experiences  during
sleep that fall short of full-fledged dreaming in some particular sense
but  whether  there  is  a  further  group  of  experiences—call  them
dreamless sleep experience in the narrow sense—that is distinct from
any of the established forms of conscious experience during sleep, in-
cluding hypnagogic imagery and sleep-thinking.  Thompson acknow-
ledges this issue (p. 14) and I only emphasize it here to avoid misun-
derstanding. 
2 Note that throughout this commentary, I will use the terms “experi-
ence”, “subjective experience”, and “consciousness” interchangeably
to describe states that have phenomenal character, or for which there
is something it is like to have them.
of sleep states and new experimental protocols
integrating  disciplined  first-person  reports  as
well as neuroscientific methods are needed.
Here, I take up this challenge and attempt
to sketch the outlines of a positive account of
dreamless  sleep  experience.  This  commentary
has  three  main  aims.  The first  is  to  propose
that Thompson’s case for dreamless sleep exper-
ience  can  be  strengthened  by  constructing  a
rough analogy between the historical Indian de-
bate  on  dreamless  sleep  and  contemporary
Western debates from scientific dream research
and  philosophy  on  the  epistemic  status  of
dream reports. Based on this analogy, I argue
that the default  view is  inconsistent with the
methodological background assumptions of sci-
entific sleep and dream research. This internal
inconsistency  lends  additional  urgency  to
Thompson´s  demand  for  a  more  fine-grained
taxonomy of sleep states. I then use the Indian
debate as a foil to sketch the outlines of an in-
tegrated theoretical position on the trustworthi-
ness  of  first-person  reports  of  dreams  and
dreamless sleep experience. I take this approach
to be in the spirit of the type of cross-cultural
approach recommended by Thompson and hope
to show that valuable lessons can be learned on
both sides.
My second aim is to sketch the outlines of
a positive account of dreamless sleep experience.
Here, my key claim is that dreamless sleep ex-
perience can be described as pure temporal ex-
perience.  By  this  I  mean  phenomenal  states
that  aside  from  their  temporal  structure  are
devoid  of  any further  intentional  content  and
characterized only by the subjective experience
of time. Pure temporal experience (or pure sub-
jective temporality, as I will also sometimes call
it) is not structured around perceptual objects,
events or emotions; it is the experience of being
just in time.3 This account of dreamless sleep
3 At first sight, there is an inherent ambiguity in the concept of pure
subjective temporality in that it can refer to the experiential charac-
ter of nowness, but also to the experience of duration and of succes-
sion. In section 4, it will become clear that in the account defended
here, the two aspects of nowness and duration are not strictly disso-
ciable: the simplest forms of temporal experience are characterized
by both a phenomenal now and the experience of duration, because
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experience is attractive, or so I claim, because it
offers a way of spelling out not just what is dis-
tinctive about dreamless  sleep experience,  but
also how dreamless sleep experience can be in-
tegrated  into  a  broader  theoretical  framework
describing different kinds of  sleep experiences,
including  dreams.  The key idea  is  that  while
even the simplest forms of dreaming are charac-
terized by phenomenal selfhood, or the experi-
ence  of  being  or  having  a  self,  the transition
from dreaming to dreamless sleep experience oc-
curs when even this minimal form of phenom-
enal  selfhood  is  lost.  While  the  analysis  of
dreaming can help  identify  the  conditions  for
minimal  phenomenal  selfhood,  the  analysis  of
dreamless  sleep  experience  may  provide  a
glimpse of an even simpler (and perhaps even
minimal) form of phenomenal experience. In the
final part of the commentary, I identify what I
take to be the three most promising candidates
for  a  future  research  program  on  dreamless
sleep  experience.  These  are  lucid  dreamless
sleep, white dreams, and sleep-state mispercep-
tion of the type most commonly seen in subject-
ive insomnia. These examples broaden the scope
of  the  target  phenomenon  by suggesting  that
the theoretical and experimental investigation of
dreamless sleep experience extends beyond the
case  of  expert  meditators  discussed  by
Thompson. 
2 From the classical Indian debate to a 
new taxonomy of experience during 
dreamless sleep 
In  Dreamless  Sleep,  the  Embodied  Mind,  and
Consciousness,  Evan Thompson retraces  the
steps of the classical Indian debate between the
Advaitins  and  the  Nyaiyāyikas  on  the  occur-
rence of conscious experience during dreamless
sleep (see also  Thompson 2014, chap. 8). The
classical Indian debate is important, according
to Thompson, because if the Advaita Vedānta
the phenomenal now itself is temporally stretched. Though for reas-
ons of space, I cannot discuss this any further here, note that once
the distinction between the phenomenal  now and the experience of
duration collapses, the experience of seriality or of succession disap-
pears as well: if the phenomenal now is no longer embedded within a
larger  temporal  reference  frame,  then  there  will  be  no  separate
events that can be experienced as succeeding each other. 
and Yoga claims about the persistence of con-
sciousness  during  dreamless  sleep  are  correct,
the default view of consciousness as that which
disappears during dreamless sleep is false and
requires revision. In this section, I briefly recon-
struct Thompson’s main arguments and sharpen
the  precise  points  of  agreement  and disagree-
ment in the classical Indian debate, as well as
their overlap with questions raised in cognitive
science and contemporary philosophy of mind. I
also introduce three challenges to Thompson’s
view.
Thompson’s reconstruction of the classical
Indian  debate  starts  out  from  a  deceptively
simple  question:  How,  after  awakening  from
sleep,  do we know that  we have  slept  peace-
fully? The Yoga and Advaita Vedānta schools
argue that retrospective reports of having slept
peacefully are memory reports: we directly and
non-inferentially remember (and hence are able
to report) a state in which we were phenomen-
ally conscious, but did not experience any par-
ticular thoughts or images. Dreamless sleep ex-
perience is, in this view, devoid of intentional
content; it is a state of knowing nothing and at
least in principle, it can be remembered and ac-
curately reported upon awakening. The Nyāyas
disagree,  arguing  that  reports  of  having  slept
peacefully are inferential. Their point is that if
dreamless sleep involves a particular form of ig-
norance,  or  of  not-knowing,  this  not-knowing
cannot itself  be known, either during sleep or
retrospectively.  Because  the  means  for  know-
ledge are lacking during dreamless sleep, we can
at best infer, when we wake up feeling refreshed
and remember nothing, that we must have slept
peacefully. 
As Thompson (sec. 3) points out, the clas-
sical debate about conscious experience during
dreamless sleep has to be seen in the larger con-
text of how these schools construe the relation-
ship between consciousness and the self. For the
Nyāyas, consciousness is an adventitious prop-
erty of the self, meaning that the self can per-
sist throughout sleep even when consciousness
ceases.  They also claim that  cognition  always
involves taking something as its object, where
this object is necessarily distinct from the cog-
nitive state itself. This view is compatible with
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the  occurrence  of  object-directed  thought and
dream-related imagery during sleep, but prohib-
its the occurrence of objectless cognitive states.
For the Advaitins, the situation is different. Be-
cause  for  them,  the self  is  pure,  reflexive  (or
self-luminous) consciousness, they cannot allow
that  consciousness  can  disappear  altogether
even during sleep, because this would entail a
disappearance  of  the  self.  Unlike  the  Nyāyas,
the Advaitins do not, however, take conscious-
ness to be necessarily object-directed. Instead,
they regard the essentially reflexive and self-lu-
minous character of consciousness and the self
as separate from and indeed as the very condi-
tion  of  object-directed  thought.  A  prediction
would be that “pure” cases of reflexive, self-lu-
minous consciousness should occur even in the
absence of object-directedness, for instance dur-
ing sleep. 
Despite  these  differences,  the  debate  on
dreamless  sleep  experience  unfolds  before  a
background of mutual agreement. Both schools
agree,  for  instance,  that  object-directed  con-
sciousness  can  (and  does,  for  instance  in  the
form of  dreams)  occur  during  sleep,  but  also
that it does not persist throughout sleep. Both
also  agree  that  dreamless  sleep  is  a  state  in
which  object-directedness  is  lost.  And  finally,
both  agree  that  the  self  persists  throughout
dreamless sleep, even in the absence of object-
directedness.  Their  disagreement  thus  hinges,
first, on what exactly it means to say that the
self persists during dreamless sleep, understood
in the sense of a state in which object-directed
thought is lost, and second, on how to construe
the relationship between consciousness, the self,
and memory reports. Both points are relevant,
as  we  will  see,  for  assessing  the  relationship
between  the  Indian  debate  and  contemporary
research as well.
How, then, to adjudicate between the two
sides in the debate? Thompson (p. 6) reconstructs
the Nyāya claim that our knowledge of dreamless
sleep is inferential as involving a five-step syllo-
gism.  His  discussion  of  the  Nyāya syllogism is
already so clear  that  nothing would  be gained
from rehearsing it once more here. Instead, I want
only  to  recall  to  readers’  attention  that
Thompson’s reconstruction of  the Adavaitin re-
sponse shows the Nyāya syllogism to be inher-
ently fallacious: it is either circular or results in
an infinite regress. In order to infer from the fact
that I was in a special state that I knew nothing
in this state, I must first have a reason for saying
that I was indeed in a special state; and if this
reason is that I knew nothing in this state, I am
presuming what is supposed to be shown and the
argument is circular. Alternatively, if I say that
the means for knowledge were lacking in this spe-
cial  state,  for instance because the mental fac-
ulties and the senses were inactive, then this fur-
ther claim has to be backed up by independent
evidence.  Saying  that  I  felt  refreshed  upon
awakening will not do—for in order to know that
feeling  refreshed  after  awakening  is  correlated
with the inactivity of the mental faculties and the
senses during sleep, I would either once more have
to appeal to memory (which, on pains of circular-
ity, I cannot do), or I would be headed for an in-
finite regress.  Thompson sums up his critique of
the  Nyāya  syllogism  by  formulating  a  general
principle: 
More generally, the only way I can know
that the means for knowledge were absent
in deep sleep is by knowing that there was
no knowledge present in this state. Only
by  knowing  the  effect—my not  knowing
anything—can I infer the cause—the ab-
sence of the means for knowledge. So un-
less I already know what the inference is
trying to establish—that I knew nothing—
I cannot establish the reason on which the
inference relies. (p. 7) 
The Advaitin view offers an easy way out. As
Thompson points out, it can be reconstructed
as involving the phenomenological claim 
that when I wake up from a dreamless sleep,
it seems that I can sometimes knowingly say
I have just emerged from a dreamless sleep,
and this saying seems to be a reporting of
my awareness, not the product of having to
reason things out. (p. 8)
At least in principle, the subjective impression
of having awakened from dreamless sleep can be
Windt, J. M. (2015). Just in Time—Dreamless Sleep Experience as Pure Subjective Temporality – A Commentary on Evan Thompson.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 37(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571174 4 | 34
www.open-mind.net
reflected in veridical reports of awareness during
dreamless sleep. 
It is important to see that Thompson’s as-
sessment of the Indian debate does not lead to a
whole-hearted  endorsement  of  the  Advaitin
view;  the  view  he  promotes  is  in  fact  much
more subtle, and also more humble. Thompson’s
main goal is to establish the logical possibility
of dreamless sleep experience. For this, it is suf-
ficient that veridical memories of having slept
dreamlessly are possible in principle (p. 5, p. 9).
He  also  explicitly  allows  that  there  could  be
cases  in  which  one’s  memory  of  having  slept
peacefully  and  dreamlessly  is  mistaken.
Thompson’s view is also weaker than the Ad-
vaitin position in that it is not committed to
the persistence of conscious experience through-
out sleep, but leaves room for periods of uncon-
sciousness  during  sleep.  According  to
Thompson,  the  mere  possibility  of  dreamless
sleep experience challenges the default view and
highlights the need for a refined taxonomy of
sleep states, because such a refined taxonomy is
the condition for investigating dreamless sleep
experience experimentally (p. 3). 
To  be  sure,  Thompson  also  offers  some
factual  evidence  for  thinking  that  dreamless
sleep  experience  actually  exists:  experienced
meditators report witnessing or becoming lucid
during  dreamless  sleep,  and  they  show  a
changed  pattern  of  EEG activity  during  slow
wave  sleep.  Meditative  training  may,  as
Thompson  suggests,  facilitate  cognitive  access
to the state of dreamless sleep (p. 11) and with
it, more accurate reports. But his main point is
that conceptual and empirical questions about
dreamless sleep experience are well worth asking
and that in order to do so, prominent theories
of  sleep,  but  also  of  consciousness  (such  as
Tononi’s  Integrated  Information  Theory;  see
Tononi 2008) should at least make room for the
possibility of its occurrence and require revision.
While I find Thompson´s case for the lo-
gical  possibility  and  conceptual  coherence  of
dreamless sleep experience compelling, I worry
that its humility makes it vulnerable to three
related objections. A proponent of the default
view could acknowledge that veridical reports of
dreamless sleep experience are logically possible
but  could insist  that  unless  such veridical  re-
ports are identifiable and can be distinguished
from nonveridical ones, such reports cannot be
used  for  the  experimental  investigation  of
dreamless  sleep  experience,  or  only  in  a  very
small  and  admittedly  special  group  of  highly
trained  subjects.  Thompson’s  own  suggestions
for the future investigation of  dreamless sleep
experience assume that this basic problem has
been solved. For instance, he proposes that be-
cause dreamless sleep experience is supposed to
be devoid of  intentional  objects,  asking parti-
cipants  to  report  anything  that  was  going
through their minds before awakening, which is
a question about the objects of awareness or the
contents  of  consciousness,  might  be  poorly
suited to the  target  phenomenon.  A good al-
ternative, he suggests, would be to direct parti-
cipants’ attention to the phenomenal character
of sleep itself, for instance by asking them to re-
port any feelings or any qualitative states ex-
perienced before awakening (p.  12).  Here,  the
proponent of the default view might object that
this strategy falls short of a methodology for in-
vestigating dreamless sleep experience: In order
to use reports of dreamless sleep experience as
evidence,  some  rationale  for  distinguishing
veridical  reports  from  nonveridical  ones  is
needed. Without this, the large-scale revision of
standard  sleep-state  taxonomy  demanded  by
Thompson  may  seem  premature;  Thompson’s
case for the mere possibility of dreamless sleep
experience lacks the empirical grounding and re-
search methodology to justify such a move. 
A related problem is that in order to em-
pirically investigate the occurrence of dreamless
sleep  experience,  it  is  not  enough  to  identify
veridical reports of such experiences and distin-
guish them from nonveridical ones. Instead, in
order to determine the frequency of dreamless
sleep experience, one has to determine whether
subjects can reliably report not just the pres-
ence of dreamless sleep experience, but also its
absence. This problem is especially pronounced
because Thompson’s claim is  not that experi-
ence  persists  throughout  sleep.  As  we  saw
earlier,  his  view  departs  from  the  Advaitin
claim in that he thinks that dreamless sleep ex-
perience occurs only occasionally and contrasts
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with periods of genuine unconsciousness during
sleep. A report-based methodology for investig-
ating  dreamless  sleep  experience  will  con-
sequently have to assume not only that reports
of  dreamless  sleep experience  reliably  indicate
the presence of such experience during the pre-
ceding sleep period, but also that the absence of
such experiences can be reliably reported, or at
least that it can be inferred from the absence of
reports  of  dreamless  sleep  experience.  Unless
this  second  condition  is  fulfilled,  reports  of
dreamless sleep experience could be highly reli-
able  in  that  they  occur  only  when dreamless
sleep experience was in fact present during the
preceding  sleep  period,  but  could  nonetheless
fail to be sensitive to its actual frequency, for
instance by only following a small proportion of
such sleep experiences (for a discussion of the
reliability and sensitivity of first-person reports,
see Fink unpublished manuscript). 
Thompson himself  shies  away from both
commitments. In fact, he casts doubt on the as-
sumption,  common  in  cognitive  neuroscience,
“that a content of consciousness is a reportable
content, and that reportable contents are ones
that can be attentionally selected, held in work-
ing memory, and used to guide thought and ac-
tion” (p. 12). Relatedly, 
the general  point that retrospective obli-
vion does not prove a prior lack of con-
sciousness must be kept in mind whenever
we are tempted to infer that consciousness
is absent in deep sleep because people re-
port not being able to remember anything
when they are woken up. (p. 11)
Here,  he might be read as effectively denying
the possibility of using retrospective reports as
a source of evidence for the scientific investiga-
tion  of  dreamless  sleep  experience.  Moreover,
given  these  doubts  about  the  reliability  and
sensitivity of retrospective reports,  Thompson’s
(p. 17) proposal that meditation makes positive
occurrences  of  dreamless  sleep  experience  ac-
cessible to verbal report is not enough; a pro-
ponent of the default view could object that ex-
pertise of the relevant type is acquired only if
meditation enables periods of unconscious sleep
to  be  retrospectively  reported  as  well  (or  at
least to be measured indirectly through the in-
ability to report conscious experiences from the
preceding sleep period).
Finally,  a  proponent  of  the default  view
might grant that reports of expert meditators
are more trustworthy than those of laypeople in
both respects: meditators can report both when
dreamless  sleep  experience  was  present  and
when it was absent.4 Yet, it could still be objec-
ted  that  the  example  of  expert  meditators  is
simply too remote to justify the large-scale revi-
sion  of  sleep-state  taxonomy  that  Thompson
has in mind. For all  practical purposes,  or so
the objection might go, the default view of con-
sciousness and dreamless sleep as diametrically
opposing and mutually exclusive states stands. 
To be clear,  I  do not think these objec-
tions are particularly worrisome; but I do think
they help set the agenda for how best to de-
velop Thompson’s view, defend it against skep-
tical objections, and place it on broader empir-
ical grounding. The first step, taken in the next
section, is to introduce a stronger defense of the
trustworthiness of reports of dreamless sleep ex-
perience, as well of reports of its absence. If suc-
cessful,  this  provides  a  sound  methodological
basis  for  the  experimental  investigation  of
dreamless sleep experience. The second step is
to provide a broader theoretical and empirical
basis by proposing a conceptual framework of
dreamless sleep experience as well as additional
candidates for its future investigation.
3 Are reports of dreamless sleep 
experience trustworthy? The analogy 
between the Indian debate on 
dreamless sleep and the contemporary 
debate on dream reports
In this section, I draw an analogy between the
Indian  debate  on  dreamless  sleep  experience
and the contemporary debate on the trustwor-
4 It remains controversial whether different forms of meditation actu-
ally enhance introspective accuracy. While there is some evidence in
support of this claim (Fox et al. 2012; Sze et al. 2010), at least one
study has suggested that meditators may feel more confident than
controls  about  their  ability  to  successfully  perform  interoceptive
tasks (such as heartbeat detection), but that this confidence is not
paralleled by an actual improvement in task performance (Khalsa et
al. 2008).
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thiness of dream reports. This analogy provides
the resources for overcoming the first two chal-
lenges to Thompson’s argument. In particular,
it  reveals  the  default  view  to  be  inconsistent
with  the  methodological  background  assump-
tions  of  scientific  sleep  and  dream  research.
Given their own methodological commitments,
researchers in these fields should reject the de-
fault view. 
3.1 The methodological background 
assumptions of scientific dream 
research: Lessons for the investigation
of dreamless sleep experience 
The first  step towards seeing why the default
view  is  inconsistent  with  scientific  dream  re-
search is to realize that this field, at least impli-
citly,  relies on the assumption that reports of
conscious  experience  during  sleep  are  trust-
worthy: at least when they are given under cer-
tain (sufficiently) ideal conditions and immedi-
ately after awakening from sleep, such reports
are taken to reflect what was experienced dur-
ing  the  preceding  sleep  period,  and  indeed
whether anything was experienced at all. What
exactly the (sufficiently) ideal conditions for re-
porting sleep experiences consist in is an empir-
ical question, and in scientific dream research,
much work has been dedicated to its investiga-
tion (for discussion and further references, see
Windt 2013,  2015,  chaps.  3  and 4).  There  is
widespread agreement that temporal proximity
is  a  crucial  factor:  reports  given  immediately
after awakening are commonly taken to be least
vulnerable to forgetting. The sleeping environ-
ment  (at  home  versus  in  the  laboratory),
method of awakening, interaction with experi-
menters, and precise wording of questions also
play  an  important  role  (Domhoff 1996,  2003;
Hall & Van de Castle 1966; Kramer 2013; Win-
get 1979).  Different  reporting  techniques  may
be suitable for different research questions, and
aside from being asked for verbal reports, parti-
cipants may be encouraged to produce a dream
drawing or compare the visual imagery in their
dream with photographs with varying degrees,
for  instance,  of  color  saturation  or  brightness
(Rechtschaffen & Buchignani 1992). While there
may be uncertainty, in a given case, as to the
sincerity of a report, this is a practical matter,
not a deep theoretical problem.5 The key idea is
that by improving reporting conditions and tail-
oring the reporting technique used in a given
study to the specific research question, this risk
can be minimized. For now, my main point is
that this strategy, which is already well estab-
lished  in  scientific  sleep  and  dream  research,
only makes sense against a background of basic
trust in at least a subset of dream reports.
This  basic  idea  is  very  much in  keeping
with  Thompson’s  proposal  of  asking  parti-
cipants  to  report  any  feelings  or  qualitative
states  experienced  prior  to  awakening,  rather
than asking them to focus on the contents of
conscious thought. By directing participants’ at-
tention to certain aspects of sleep experience or
even introducing new experiential categories for
their description (an excellent example of this
strategy  is  Lutz et  al. 2002),  the  expressive
granularity6 of  individual  reports  can  be  in-
creased:  types of  experiences  can be rendered
reportable that would otherwise be forgotten. A
compelling  possibility  is  that  in  the  case  of
dreamless sleep experience, such improvements
in reporting conditions may not just supplement
training, as suggested by Thompson, but may
even  facilitate  the  investigation  of  dreamless
sleep  experience  in  participants  who lack any
particular introspective training.7 
Admittedly,  this  approach  does  not
provide a fail-safe method for avoiding or even
identifying nonveridical reports. Rather than fo-
5 Researchers occasionally worry, for instance, that participants may
underreport  embarrassing  dream  content;  censorship  of  this  type
may be why sexual dream content is only rarely reported in laborat-
ory studies (Hobson 1988); see also Rosen’s (2013) discussion of will-
ful narrative fabrication of dream reports. For the investigation of
dreamless sleep experience, which is, after all, thought to be devoid
of such content, such worries about censorship do not seem to apply. 
6 I owe this term to Sascha Fink; see for instance Fink 2015, p. 23; for
discussion, see Windt 2015, p. 92.
7 As Solomonova et al. (2014) note, it is important to distinguish ques-
tions  about  the  range  of  possible  experiences  in  dreams  (or  the
“depth” of dreaming) from those about their typical characteristics
in the general population (or the “breadth” of dreaming), and what
counts as the ideal reporting conditions in the context of a given
study depends on which of these questions is being addressed. For
now, note that because expertise is likely most useful for answering
questions about the depth of experience, and because expert reports
may not be representative of the breadth of the target phenomenon,
broadening the investigation of dreamless sleep experience beyond
expert groups is an important goal for future research.
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cusing on the veridicality of individual reports,
the strategy is to identify which types of reports
are best tailored to a given question and under
which conditions they are most likely to be ob-
tained. The problem of identifying individual re-
ports of a certain type for which this strategy
has failed is  thus not obliterated,  but minim-
ized.8 What is more important is that there is,
in this view, a distinction to be drawn between
general opinions about experience and  reports
of individual experiences. Note that reports, in
this  context,  are  broadly  construed  as  the
product of (verbal or nonverbal) behaviors con-
8 Strictly speaking, it cannot be ruled out that even for reports ob-
tained under seemingly ideal  conditions—for  instance immediately
after awakening, and using appropriately worded questions—certain
subject groups are particularly prone to memory failure or confabu-
lation (Rosen 2013), or that results are distorted because of further
disturbing factors that have so-far been overlooked. The challenge
will then be to identify such potentially disturbing factors, manipu-
late them experimentally, and derive certain predictions on how they
will affect data obtained from the analysis of dream reports. These
factors can then be integrated into a future, improved and more em-
pirically plausible account of the ideal conditions of dream reporting.
For now, my main point is that this strategy only makes sense if one
already assumes that some subset of dream reports can be used as a
baseline against which other, less trustworthy ones can be measured.
The study of dream emotions is a nice example of how this strategy
has been put to work in dream research. Views on the both the fre-
quency  and  the  types  of  emotions  experienced  in  dreams  have
changed quite dramatically as new methods of collecting and scoring
dream reports  have  been  developed.  Whereas  older  studies  using
classical dream content analysis suggested that dream emotions are
relatively rare (Hall & Van de Castle 1966), the frequency of repor-
ted dream emotions increases tenfold when subjects are specifically
asked to report their emotions on a line-by-line basis (Merritt et al.
1994). Affirmative probes of this sort suggest that dreams are “hy-
peremotional”,  with  emotions  being  mentioned  in  95  percent  of
dream reports and the average dream report containing several dif-
ferent types of emotions. A plausible explanation is that dream emo-
tions are underreported in free dream reports of the type used in
older studies; free dream reports, in this view, are insufficient to cap-
ture the actual frequency of dream emotions. Until very recently, the
accepted view was that the types of emotions experienced in dreams
differ from those experienced in wakefulness in that dream emotions
are predominately negative (Hobson et al. 2000). However, a recent
study compared external  ratings  of emotions  in  dream reports  to
scores  obtained  when  participants  answered  a  standard  emotion
questionnaire themselves. Sikka et al. (2014) found that external rat-
ings underestimate not only the frequency but also the types of emo-
tions experienced in dreams. A particularly surprising result was that
self-ratings showed positive dream emotions to be six times more fre-
quent  than negative  ones.  The  systematicity  of  the  differences  is
compelling and the same pattern was found in a number of follow-up
studies (Sikka et al. 2014), suggesting that the use of self-ratings is a
more reliable method for capturing the frequency and types of dream
emotions than the use of external raters. This is not so say that the
conditions for reporting and scoring dream emotions cannot be fur-
ther  improved.  But  this  example  does  illustrate  that  theoretical
views on dream emotions changed in tandem with changed and likely
improved reporting and scoring conditions. Again, the idea is that
methodological adjustments can obscure or render visible different
aspects of the phenomenology of dreaming.
ducted with the  sincere intent of conveying or
recording certain relevant information about a
specific  dream (for  details,  see  Windt 2015,
chap. 3.3) Questionnaires asking participants to
assess the general frequency with which, for in-
stance, they dream in color do not count as ex-
perience reports  in  this  narrow sense.  Indeed,
there are good reasons for doubting the trust-
worthiness  of  responses  to  such  general  ques-
tionnaires,  and in some cases,  they have even
been shown to be at odds with individual re-
ports (Schwitzgebel 2002, 2011, chap. 1; Windt
2013,  2015,  chap.  4.3).  At  best,  such  general
questionnaires tap into opinions about experi-
ence,  but  whether  these  opinions  match  the
phenomenal character of the corresponding ex-
periences  is  a  separate  question.  Importantly,
questions about the relative trustworthiness of
responses  to  general  questionnaires  can  be
meaningfully investigated only if the trustwor-
thiness of at least a subgroup of dream reports
is assumed (Windt 2015, chap. 4.4). This sub-
group can then act as a baseline and can be
used to determine the relative trustworthiness
of answers to general questionnaires, but also of
different types of reports. While the exact de-
tails continue to be debated (for instance on the
laboratory  effect),  there  is  widespread  agree-
ment in scientific dream research that dream re-
ports gathered immediately upon awakening, as
is  common  in  laboratory  studies  using  timed
awakenings from different sleep stages, are the
gold  standard  against  which  other  types  of
dream  reports  (such  as  home  dream  diaries
compiled following spontaneous awakening) can
be measured (again the debate on dream color
is a good example; see Hoss 2010; Murzyn 2008;
Schredl et al. 2008).
Importantly,  as  discussed  earlier,  the  as-
sumption  that  dream reports  are  trustworthy
translates  into  a  research  strategy  only  if  re-
ports of nondreaming are taken to be equally
trustworthy  as  reports  of  dreaming,  at  least
when they are gathered under the same condi-
tions. If the reporting conditions used in a given
study are (sufficiently)  ideal,  it  would,  surely,
be arbitrary to disqualify a subset of these re-
ports on the basis of their content alone. In or-
der to do so, some independent reasons for at-
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tributing reports of nondreaming to disturbing
factors would be needed. It does not make sense
to trust dream reports, but selectively distrust
reports  of  nondreaming  gathered  under  the
same conditions and in the absence of any em-
pirical evidence for distrusting them. Put differ-
ently,  dreams will  have to be regarded as re-
portable  experiences,  in  the  sense  that  given
sufficiently  ideal  reporting  conditions,  their
presence or absence,  respectively,  can actually
be reported. Importantly, both assumptions are
implicit in the scientific investigation of dreams.
A brief excursion into the history of philosoph-
ical  and  scientific  theorizing  about  sleep  and
dreaming illustrates this point. 
The beginning of scientific dream research
coincided  with  a  new experimental  paradigm:
the  practice  of  obtaining  polysomnographic
measurements of EEG activity, muscle tone and
eye  movements  from  subjects  sleeping  in  the
sleep laboratory and of obtaining mentation re-
ports following timed awakenings. This method-
ology revealed reports of dreaming to be most
frequent following awakenings from REM (rapid
eye movement) sleep, whereas awakenings from
NREM (non-REM) sleep were typically followed
by an inability to recall  any dreams. In their
groundbreaking  paper  on  the  correlation
between dreaming and REM sleep, Aserinsky &
Kleitman (1953)  optimistically  claimed  that
that  the  method  of  timed  awakenings  from
REM sleep “furnishes the means of determining
the incidence and duration of periods of dream-
ing” (Aserinsky &  Kleitman 1953, p. 274; my
emphasis).9 They  very  naturally  took  the  re-
ports given by their subjects to reflect conscious
experience  during  the  preceding  sleep  period,
noting  that  “of  27  interrogations  during  [sic]
ocular motility, 20 revealed detailed dreams usu-
ally  involving  visual  imagery”  (Aserinsky &
Kleitman 1953, p. 273; my emphasis). Because
the method of obtaining reports following timed
awakenings in the laboratory is, arguably, the
backbone of scientific dream research, this as-
sumption is not unique to Aserinky and Kleit-
9 Today, it is widely recognized that dreams can occur in all stages of
sleep and are not exclusively a REM sleep phenomenon. Incidentally,
this recognition may also lead to refined sleep-stage scoring systems
and  a  blurring  of  the  borders  between  REM  and  NREM  sleep
(Nielsen 2000; see also Windt 2015, chap. 2).
man’s  original  study.  Instead,  scientific  dream
research generally relies on the assumption that
dream reports  (at  least  when  gathered  under
ideal  reporting  conditions,  of  which  timed
awakenings in the laboratory are taken to be a
prime example) are epistemically transparent in
the sense that they are trustworthy sources of
evidence about the occurrence and phenomenal
character of experience during sleep. I call this
the  transparency  assumption (Windt 2013,
2015).10
It is important to see that on its own, the
transparency assumption  would be insufficient
to establish the presumed correlation between
dreaming  and  REM sleep.  Claims  about  the
sleep-stage or neural correlates of dreaming re-
quire  that  reports  of  dreaming  and  of  non-
dreaming, when gathered under the same condi-
tions, are equally trustworthy: if only reports of
dreaming were trustworthy, but reports of non-
dreaming were not, then the analysis of dream
reports would be insufficient to determine the
occurrence and frequency of dreams during dif-
ferent sleep stages. Saying that dream reports
are  transparent  is  not  quite  enough:  one  will
also have to assume that dreams are reportable
experiences in the sense that had any dream oc-
curred in a given sleep stage, one would in fact
be able to report it, at least under sufficiently
ideal reporting conditions. I call this the report-
ability assumption (for details, see Windt 2015,
chap.s  3 and 4).  Only this  added assumption
casts reports of dreaming and of nondreaming
as equally trustworthy and thus enables reports
to be indicative of the occurrence and frequency
of dreaming in different sleep stages. The emer-
ging picture is that scientific dream research not
just uses dream reports,  under the assumption
of transparency, to investigate conscious experi-
ence during sleep, but that in doing so, it is also
methodologically constrained by the space of re-
portable dreams. Its implicit commitment to the
10 Here, I use the concept of epistemic transparency in a non-technical
and  metaphorical  sense,  intending  to  capture  the  intuition  that
dream reports are the closest researchers can come to “watching the
sleeping mind” (Cartwright 2010, p. 17). The choice of terminology
also reflects the fact that dream reports are not identical with, but
better conceived of as separate from dreaming. Finally, transparency
is  a  nod to the historical  situation that  the theoretical  problems
raised by dream reporting were nearly invisible throughout most of
the history of philosophical theorizing about dreaming.
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trustworthiness  of  reports  of  dreaming and of
nondreaming means that it  cannot go beyond
what is in fact reported without risking internal
inconsistency; it can only strive to render fur-
ther aspects of dreaming reportable. Metaphor-
ically speaking, the space of reportable dreams
can be expanded; it can be broadened to cover
more  aspects  of  what  characterizes  typical
dreams, or perhaps also to include more diverse
types of  dreams;  and it  can be deepened,  by
probing the unique aspects of certain types of
dreams (such as nightmares) or the dreams of
certain subject groups (such as meditators) in
more detail (see  Solomonova et al. 2014). Im-
portantly, this reliance on dream reports is not
a liability, a problem to be overcome: it is built
into  the  very nature  of  dream research.  Con-
versely, studies relying only on the polysomno-
graphic  analysis  of  sleep  stages  and/or
neuroimaging  data  gathered  independently  of
dream reports do not form part of  dream re-
search proper (Windt 2015, chap. 3.2).
How does this account of dream report-
ing help address the objections to Thompson’s
argument discussed at the end of the last sec-
tion?  The  strategy  of  focusing  on  reports
gathered  under  (sufficiently)  ideal  reporting
conditions and working towards a continuous
improvement of these conditions is clearly rel-
evant  to  the  first  objection,  according  to
which the mere possibility of veridical reports
is not enough. As soon as we broaden our fo-
cus from reports of dreamless sleep experience
to  reports  of  sleep  experience  (including
dreams) more generally, it becomes clear that
scientific  dream  research  has  long  been
centered on the project of identifying and op-
timizing  the  trustworthiness  of  such  reports,
as well as on determining the adequacy of dif-
ferent kinds of reports for addressing various
research questions. Indeed, the very existence
of scientific dream research hinges on the as-
sumption that this can be done. Moreover, we
have seen that the assumption that reports of
dreaming  and  of  nondreaming  are  equally
trustworthy  is  implicit  in  this  research
strategy. This assumption is directly relevant
to  the  second  objection,  according  to  which
reports  of  dreamless  sleep  experience can be
used  for  the  investigation  of  dreamless  sleep
experience  only  if  they  help  detect  both  its
presence and its absence. 
Moreover, this proposal is, I think, com-
patible with Thompson’s own strategy of focus-
ing on reports from certain expert groups and
improving the wording of questions. Indeed, this
strategy of directing participants’  attention to
certain aspects of their experience rather than
asking for a free report nicely parallels recent
work  suggesting  that  a  self-scoring  method,
where participants respond to a standard ques-
tionnaire, for instance, about the emotions ex-
perienced  in  a  particular  dream,  is  a  better
measure of dream emotions than data obtained
by  external  raters  scoring  free  dream  reports
(Sikka et al. 2014; see footnote 8 for discussion).
This suggests that Thompson does not mean to
reject, as a matter of principle, the claims that
conscious  experiences  are  reportable  and  that
an absence of memory is sufficient to infer an
absence of experience. Rather, I think his posi-
tion involves the weaker claim that we should
not easily and uncritically trust just any type of
experience report  to actually  reflect  the pres-
ence  of  such experience,  nor should we easily
and uncritically trust just any failure to remem-
ber previous experience as indicating an absence
of such experience. But this weaker position is
in keeping with the account of dream reporting
outlined in this section. The challenge then be-
comes how to narrow the gap between experi-
ences that are in fact reported and those that
could  (and  would)  be  reported,  given  suffi-
ciently ideal conditions. I think this is exactly
the  problem  that  large  parts  of  report-based
dream research are already trying to address.
Note that nothing I have said so far sug-
gests that the transpareny and reportability as-
sumptions  are  theoretically  justified  (but  see
Windt 2013,  2015);  if  my analysis  is  correct,
however, both are implicit in and in fact crucial
for the entire field of scientific dream research.
This shifts the burden of proof: while reports of
dreamless sleep experience may seem to be an
easy target, if only because of the novelty and
alleged remoteness of Thompson’s proposal for
investigating dreamless sleep experience, we can
now see that the proponent of the default view
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will in fact have to take on the entire field of
(report-based) scientific dream research as well.
This raises the bar considerably; but first, more
has to be said about how the methodological
background assumptions of scientific dream re-
search actually parallel  questions asked in the
classical Indian debate. 
To begin with, note that the transparency
assumption  is  analogous  to  the  Advaitin  and
Yoga claim that upon awakening from dream-
less sleep, we can veridically remember and re-
port that we experienced nothing during sleep.
To be sure, this type of report describes an ex-
perience marked by the absence of the complex
imagery and narrative contents that character-
ize dreaming. Yet, in the Advaitin view, these
are reports of an experiential state: in reporting
having slept dreamlessly, we are reporting that
we  experienced nothing,  in  the  relevant sense,
during sleep;11 we are not reporting the absence
of experience. Thompson suggests that in order
to  turn  the  Advaitin  view  into  a  research
strategy, the most reasonable and cautious ap-
proach is to assume that dreamless experience
exists only intermittently, rather than persisting
throughout dreamless sleep. The frequency with
which dreamless sleep experience is reported to
occur upon awakening will then be regarded as
indicative of the actual occurrence of such ex-
perience. This is analogous to the reportability
assumption. To endorse the stronger claim that
dreamless  sleep experience persists  throughout
sleep, at least prior to empirical investigation,
would be to legislate an answer to the question
of dreamless sleep experience. The weaker claim
complements  the  assumption,  implicit  in  sci-
entific dream research, that periods of dreaming
contrast with periods of nondreaming, which is
quite different from saying that dreaming per-
sists throughout sleep. 
By combining my analysis of the methodo-
logical  background  assumptions  of  scientific
dream research  with  Thompson’s  proposal  on
11 At this point, it might be objected that this formulation rides on a
reification  of  the  word  “nothing”,  as  if  “nothing”  itself  could  be
turned into an object of experience. I return to this problem in sec-
tion  4;  as  will  hopefully become clear,  my own positive model  of
dreamless  sleep  experience  avoids  this  problem  by  introducing  a
qualified reading of what is described, in the Advaitin view, as exper-
iencing or knowing nothing.
the investigation of dreamless sleep experience,
we can see that if we were to translate the Yoga
and Advaitin view into a research methodology,
we would find it  to rely on assumptions that
run  parallel  to  those  of  scientific  dream  re-
search.  Dreamless  sleep  experiences,  or  so  a
modern-day,  scientifically-minded  Advaitin
would be forced to admit, are reportable experi-
ences; and if it should happen that (under suffi-
ciently ideal reporting conditions, such as imme-
diately after having awakened from sleep) one
were unable to recall any such experience hav-
ing happened during sleep, this would indicate
that no such experience had occurred. 
This  also  tells  us  that  reports  of  non-
dreaming should be further qualified: reporting
the absence of experience during sleep is not the
same as  reporting  dreamless  sleep  experience.
The former is an instance of reporting an ab-
sence of experience, the latter is an instance of
reporting a form of experience characterized by
the absence of intentional objects; but it is still
an  experience  report.  Yet,  while  this  requires
terminological adjustments and shows that the
concept of reporting a state of nondreaming is
ambiguous,  this  adjustment is  consistent  with
the familiar methodology; indeed, it falls out of
the  methods  already  used  in  dream research,
when they are applied to the target of dream-
less sleep experience. 
From this, we can conclude that the de-
fault view of dreamless sleep as being character-
ized by the absence of subjective experience is
intrinsically flawed for two related reasons. The
first is that by treating dreamless sleep experi-
ence as a conceptual absurdity rather than as
an open and empirically tractable question, it
misconstrues  the  nature  of  the  question  of
dreamless sleep experience. The second is that
it  stands  in  outright  contradiction  to  the  as-
sumptions implicit in the scientific investigation
of conscious experience during sleep. Dream re-
search, understood as the scientific investigation
of conscious experience during sleep, should be
expanded to include dreamless sleep experience
as well. And while this certainly will involve an
adjustment of its conceptual resources, the good
news is  that its existing methodological back-
ground assumptions can remain largely intact.
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3.2 The Indian debate revisited: Lessons 
for the philosophical debate on the 
trustworthiness of dream reports
The  analogy  between  the  Indian  debate  on
dreamless sleep experience and the background
assumptions  of  scientific  dream  research  not
only highlights the inconsistency of the default
view.  There  are  also  valuable  lessons  to  be
learned in the other direction, and considering
the historical Indian debate can enrich contem-
porary debates on the status of dream reports
as well. In particular, note that it is one thing
to say that scientific dream research is  impli-
citly committed to the transparency and report-
ability  assumptions;  but  it  is  another  to  say
that  these  assumptions  are  also  theoretically
justified. Elsewhere, I  have defended the view
that  explanatory  considerations  justify  the
transparency  and  reportability  assumptions:
construing dream reports as (largely veridical)
memory reports provides a better explanation of
dream reporting behavior than skeptical altern-
atives that construe dream reports as the result
of  inference,  misremembering  or  outright  con-
fabulation (Windt 2013, 2015, chap. 4). Here, I
want only to point out that similar considera-
tions apply to reports of dreamless sleep experi-
ence.  In  fact,  Thompson’s  response  to  the
Nyāya argument against dreamless sleep experi-
ence shows that casting reports of having slept
dreamlessly as based on inference rather than
memory is not a proper explanation at all. In-
stead, it leads to an argument that either res-
ults in an infinite regress or is circular. Again,
there is a striking similarity to a similarly skep-
tical account of dream reporting from the 20th
century. This time, the analogy with the histor-
ical Indian position will lend additional support
to anti-skepticism about dream reporting. 
To see  why,  another  brief  excursion into
the history of theorizing about scientific dream
research is instructive. Let us consider Norman
Malcolm’s  (1956,  1959a)  skeptical  argument
against the claims that dreams are conscious ex-
periences occurring during sleep and that dream
reports transparently show this to be the case.
This argument was a direct reaction to early at-
tempts, following the discovery of REM sleep,
to operationalize dreaming as a REM sleep phe-
nomenon.  Malcolm’s  argument  hinges  on  the
conceptual  claim  that  “if  a  person  is  in  any
state of consciousness it logically follows that he
is not sound asleep” (Malcolm 1956, p. 21). Ac-
cording  to  Malcolm,  even  though  we  use  the
same language to describe dreams and waking
experiences, dreams (or at least such dreams as
occur during sound sleep, which Malcolm, again
for conceptual reasons, takes to be representat-
ive  of  dreaming  proper)  are  not  experiences,
and for the same reason dream thoughts, feel-
ings,  and  emotions  are  not  real  instances  of
their kind. As Malcolm puts it, 
if a man had certain thoughts and feelings
in a dream it no more follows that he had
those thoughts and feelings while  asleep,
than it follows from his having climbed a
mountain in  a dream that  he climbed a
mountain  while  asleep.  (Malcolm 1959a,
pp. 51-52)
Malcolm’s view is complex and a detailed dis-
cussion is beyond the scope of this commentary;
suffice it to say that one of its more controver-
sial upshots is that dream recall is not a real in-
stance of remembering experience during sleep.
Instead, “statements of the form ‘I dreamt so
and so’ are always inferential in nature” (Mal-
colm 1959a,  p.  65):  one  infers  that  one  has
dreamt when one realizes, upon awakening, that
the events one seems to remember did not in
fact occur. This claim struck many of his critics
as contradicting both the common-sense under-
standing and the phenomenology of dream re-
call (see Dunlop 1977 for a collection of some of
the most  important  critical  essays;  see  Windt
2013,  2015, chap. 1 for discussion). Elsewhere,
(Malcolm 1959b) explains that he takes dream
recall to be inferential not in the psychological
sense of actually drawing this inference when we
notice that we have dreamt, but in the sense
that we could give grounds for our belief that
we dreamt if pressed to do so. However, because
he fails  to clarify what exactly these grounds
are,  his account remains sketchy. By applying
Thompson’s reconstruction of the Nyāya syllo-
gism  to  Malcolm’s  claim,  it  quickly  becomes
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clear that even a more complete reconstruction
of  the inference  would be intrinsically flawed.
The result would be something like this:
1. While I was sound asleep, I had no experi-
ences,  including  sensations,  conscious
thoughts, feelings, beliefs, or emotions.
2. This is because (i) I was in a special state
(that is, not awake) or (ii) I lacked the neces-
sary means for having experiences, including
sensations,  conscious  thoughts,  feelings,  be-
liefs,  or  emotions  (that  is,  my  senses  and
mental faculties were shut down).
3. Whenever (i) I am in a special state (that is,
whenever I am not awake) or (ii) I lack the
necessary means for having experiences,  in-
cluding sensations,  conscious thoughts,  feel-
ings,  beliefs,  or  emotions  (whenever  my
senses and mental faculties are shut down), I
do not have experiences, including sensations,
conscious thoughts, feelings, beliefs, or emo-
tions.
4. As in the case of fainting or a blow to the
head.
5. While I was sound asleep, I had no experi-
ences,  including  sensations,  conscious
thoughts, feelings, beliefs, or emotions.
Malcolm concludes that sound sleep is compar-
able to other states of unconsciousness, and “to
a  person  who  is  sound  asleep,  ‘dead  to  the
world,’  things  cannot  even  seem”  (Malcolm
1956, p. 26).
If we follow this reasoning, then dream re-
ports  cannot  ever  be  veridical  experience  re-
ports:  if  we cannot  have thoughts,  feelings or
emotions during sleep, then we also cannot have
them during dreams, and we cannot actually re-
member (or veridically report) having had them
after awakening. Rather, we sometimes awaken
with  the  impression  of  having  had  such
thoughts,  feelings  and  emotions  during  sleep;
and when we realize that they did not in fact
occur, we infer that we dreamt. 
To be fair,  there might  well  be cases  in
which dream recall does have such an inferential
nature. To use Malcom’s example, it seems pos-
sible that I could awaken with the particularly
vivid impression of having climbed a mountain
and  then  might  realize,  from the  simple  fact
that  I  was  lying  in  bed  and nowhere  near  a
mountain,  that  I  had  not  actually  climbed  a
mountain, but had been asleep. However, even
if  I  was  now  quite  sure  that  I  had  merely
dreamt that I had climbed a mountain, it would
not follow that the thoughts and feelings I re-
member having in the dream did not really oc-
cur. In order to draw this further inference, I
would have to know that dreaming is a special
state that is devoid of any experiences whatso-
ever.12 As is the case for the Nyāya syllogism,
this immediately invites the dual threats of cir-
cularity and of infinite regress: If I say I was in
a special state because the thoughts and feelings
I  experienced  in  my dream were  not  real  in-
stances of their kind, I am reasoning in a circle.
And if I say that I was in a special state be-
cause the mental faculties  required for having
thoughts and feelings were shut down (or be-
cause,  as  would  better  befit  Malcolm’s  argu-
ment, I  had temporarily lost  the capacity for
producing the types of behavioral evidence that
would  enable  another  person  to  verify  that  I
had been dreaming), then independent evidence
would  be  needed—and so  on.  Again,  without
appealing to memory, no such evidence is avail-
able. 
At this point it might seem that there is
an easy solution: Perhaps, independent evidence
for saying that dreaming is a special state has,
in  the meantime,  become available.  Malcolm’s
analysis  of  dreaming was a direct  reaction to
early studies,  discussed  in  section  3.1,  on the
correlation between REM sleep and dreaming,
and his argument made much of the alleged im-
possibility  of  acquiring  independent  evidence,
12 Incidentally, note that if it were the case that dreams are devoid of
any experiences whatsoever, it would be utterly mysterious why we
should awake with the vivid impression of having had such experi-
ences in the first place. Indeed, Malcolm provides no explanation of
why this happens. By contrast, my erroneous impression of having
climbed a mountain during sleep is nicely explained by saying that
during sleep, I had experiences that were sufficiently similar to their
waking  counterparts  to  create  this  impression.  Again,  this  comes
back to the idea that explanatory considerations favor the view that
dream reports are actual memory reports, and not inferential. Per-
haps, the difference between dreams that are belief-inviting beyond
the borders of sleep, for instance by making us actually believe, if
only for a moment, that the corresponding events actually occurred,
and more commonplace dreams that do not induce such false beliefs
can even be described in phenomenological terms (for a first proposal
of how this might be done, see Windt 2015, chap. 10). 
Windt, J. M. (2015). Just in Time—Dreamless Sleep Experience as Pure Subjective Temporality – A Commentary on Evan Thompson.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 37(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958571174 13 | 34
www.open-mind.net
over  and above dream reports,  for  the occur-
rence of dreams during sleep. Among Malcolm’s
critics, there was widespread agreement that he
was  simply  mistaken  about  this  latter  point:
sleep  behavior,  (for  instance  in  patients  with
REM sleep behavior disorder, who are thought
to act out their dreams due to a loss of REM
sleep-related muscular atonia; see Schenck 2005,
Valli et al. 2012) sleep talking, and also polyso-
mnographic  measurements  were  (and continue
to  be)  thought  to  provide  exactly  such  inde-
pendent evidence, perhaps even to the point of
enabling researchers to verify dream reports (see
for instance Ayer 1960; Rosen 2013; signal-veri-
fied lucid dreams are another example, as pro-
posed by Revonsuo 2006; see sec. 5.1 for a fuller
discussion). Yet, even though the appeal to sci-
entific dream research slightly changes the con-
tent of the argument, this merely restates the
familiar syllogism, including its problems in a
new guise.
To see why, let’s say that rapid eye move-
ments had indeed been found (as stated by the
so-called  scanning  hypothesis;  see  Dement &
Kleitman 1957, to be directly related to visual
dream imagery. Could we now analyze these eye
movement patterns to diagnose the occurrence
(and  perhaps  even  the  content)  of  dreaming
even in the absence of (or in contradiction to)
dream reports (see Dennett 1976 for the discus-
sion of this possibility)? Note that this is not an
abstract philosophical issue: dream researchers
have long dreamt the dream of moving beyond
dream reports  in  the study of  dreaming alto-
gether. This ranges from science fictional visions
of  televising  dreams  (Hall &  Van  de  Castle
1966) or of perhaps modeling them as an im-
mersive, interactive virtual  environment, as in
Antti Revonsuo’s  (2006,  pp.  300-303)  dream
catcher test, to real-world attempts to predict
the  content  of  dream reports  from behavioral
(Leclair-Visonneau et al. 2010) or neuroimaging
(Horikawa et al. 2013) data. Again, the idea is
that in the future, the analysis of neuroimaging
data might be a way to verify dream reports, or
even to move beyond their collection and ana-
lysis altogether. Elsewhere, I have argued that
such attempts are circular: Dream reports, un-
der the assumption of transparency, are used to
identify potential sleep-stage and neural correl-
ates of dreaming; but the evidence such poten-
tial correlates provide is only as strong as the
correlation, and so one cannot then turn around
and use such measures as independent evidence
to verify dream reports. Now, the Nyāya syllo-
gism and its failure present a nice and crisp il-
lustration of why this is the case. I think this is
a nice example of the fruitfulness of a cross-cul-
tural  perspective  on  the  methodological  and
conceptual issues involved in studying the oc-
currence of consciousness during sleep. 
But there is another lesson to be learned.
This is that the Nyāya syllogism is not an out-
dated problem, but one that persists even if we
place it  in the context of  scientific  dream re-
search. The question of whether reports of hav-
ing slept dreamlessly are experience reports or
inferential  is  not  of  mere  theoretical  interest,
but makes a real difference: assuming such re-
ports, at least when given under ideal reporting
conditions,  to  be  veridical  memory  reports  is
the  condition  for  a  report-based  scientific  in-
vestigation  of  the  relevant  experiences  in  the
first  place.  The  historical  debate,  and
Thompson’s  reconstruction  of  it,  nicely  high-
lights the need for acknowledging the relevance
of  first-person  reports.  Together,  they  also
strengthen the theoretical  case against  skepti-
cism  about  the  trustworthiness  of  dream  re-
ports. With this anti-skeptical account in place,
we can now move forward. In the next section, I
sketch the outlines of a conceptual framework
for describing dreamless sleep experience and its
relation to dreaming. 
4 From minimal phenomenal selfhood to 
minimal phenomenal experience: 
Towards a conceptual model of 
experience during dreamless sleep as 
pure subjective temporality
If what I have said so far is on the right track,
then the question of whether dreamless sleep, at
least on occasion, involves phenomenal experi-
ence is open to empirical investigation, and pro-
gress towards answering it can be made by ap-
plying  the  methods  already  used  in  scientific
dream  research,  for  instance  by  combining
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timed awakenings in the sleep laboratory with
questionnaires  that  are  carefully  calibrated  to
direct participants’ attention towards the relev-
ant features of  such experiences and facilitate
their  reportability.  Even  occasional  reports  of
dreamless  sleep  experience  will  support  the
claim  that  dreamless  sleep  experience  exists.
The next step towards turning the question of
dreamless  sleep experience into a scientifically
tractable research project is to draw a more pre-
cise conceptual map of the territory. Sketching
at least the rough outlines of such a conceptual
map is my aim in this section. 
Thompson’s reconstruction of the classical
Indian debate as well as his own positive pro-
posals for how to study dreamless sleep experi-
ence provide a helpful  point of  departure.  To
begin  with,  as  Thompson points  out,  the
concept of  dreamless  sleep itself  requires  phe-
nomenological refinement (p. 13).  If  dreamless
sleep experience exists, then it is not enough to
characterize dreamless sleep by the absence of
dreaming or  its  electrophysiological  correlates.
Rather, dreamless sleep can now be seen to be a
blanket  term  covering  different  types  of  con-
scious and nonconscious mental activity. Some
forms of conscious mental activity that are com-
monly  contrasted  with  dreaming  (and  in  this
simple sense can be said to occur in dreamless
sleep), such as hypnagogic imagery during sleep
onset or repetitive and non-progressive types of
sleep thinking, are not candidates for the kind
of dreamless sleep experience described in the
Indian  debate.  Dreamless  sleep  experience  in
this narrow sense, if it exists, is a form of phe-
nomenal experience characterized by noninten-
tional awareness (Thompson 2015, p. 2): “When
we’re deeply asleep […] we don’t  cognize any-
thing—there’s no object being cognized and no
awareness of the ‘I’ as knower. Nevertheless, [...]
we feel this absence while we sleep and remem-
ber  it  upon  awakening”  (Thompson 2015,  p.
238).  Dreamless  sleep  experience  is  not  just
characterized by the absence of certain object-
directed forms of conscious experience, but by
the  fact  that  this  is  an  experienced absence.
Moreover, it is not just the objects of experience
that are absent, but also the subject of experi-
ence, or the “I”. A very basic experiential fea-
ture, namely that of being an epistemic agent or
a  potential  possessor  of  knowledge,  has  been
lost (cf. Metzinger 2013 for a fuller discussion of
the  term  of  an  “epistemic  agent  model”).
Dreamless sleep experience is characterized by a
dissolution of subject-object duality, or, to put a
more contemporary gloss on this, by a break-
down of even the most basic form of the self-
other distinction (Windt et al. 2014). 
This  last  point  is  important  because  it
suggests  a  way  of  differentiating  between
dreaming and dreamless sleep experience. Many
different definitions of dreaming exist—indeed,
the lack of a uniform definition is an important
desideratum  for  theoretical  and  experimental
work on dreaming—but work on  dreaming in
philosophy of  mind often focusses on a struc-
tural feature of dream experience. The assump-
tion that dreaming involves the experience of a
self in a world marks a point of convergence for
philosophers  of  different  stripes,  ranging  from
contemporary philosophers of mind working to-
wards an empirically informed theory of dream-
ing (Metzinger 2003; Revonsuo 2006) to authors
working in the tradition of classical phenomeno-
logy  (Husserl 2006;  Conrad 1968).13 Studies
have shown that an overwhelming majority of
dream reports describe the presence of a dream
self (Strauch & Meier 1996) though the precise
way in which the dream self  is  represented is
variable (Occhionero et al. 2005;  McNamara et
al. 2007).  The  description  of  dreams  as  in-
volving not just a self in a world, but an inter-
subjective world has even informed theories on
the  functions  of  dreaming  (see  for  instance
13 Note that this way of thinking about phenomenal selfhood is quite
different from the way the term “self” is used in the classical Indian
literature. In his reconstruction of the Advaita Vedānta concept of
witnessing, Fasching (2010) notes that the “‘witness’ (sāksin) is not
understood as an observing entity standing opposed to what it ob-
serves, but as the very taking place of ‘witnessing’ itself, and ‘wit-
nessing’ is nothing other than the taking place of the experiential
presence of the experiences, in which the experiences have their very
being-experienced  and  thereby  their  existence.”  (p.  204)  
In this conception, “the ‘self’ is nothing other than becoming aware
of experiential presence (consciousness) as such” (p. 207); it is “not a
structural moment of what is given, but is  the very taking place of
givenness itself” (p. 210). Recall that one of the points of agreement
between the Advaitins  and the  Nyāyas was  that  the  self  persists
throughout sleep. But this is not the reading of the concept of “self”
that Thompson (2014; see for instance chap. 10) has in mind when
he says  that  in dreamless  sleep experience,  there  is  no longer an
awareness of the “I”, or what I mean when I speak of phenomenal
selfhood.
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Revonsuo et al.’s  2015 theory of dreaming as a
simulation  of  social  reality).  Importantly,  the
description of dreaming as the experience of a
self  in  a  world  also  informs Thompson’s  own
work on dreaming. In  Waking, Dreaming, Be-
ing,  he tells us that “the core feature of full-
blown dreaming is the experience of immersion
in the dream world” (Thompson 2014, p. 127),
and also that this immersive quality is exactly
what distinguishes  hypnagogic  imagery during
sleep  onset  from  dreaming  (pp.  135ff.).  The
hypnagogic  state  is  a  state  of  absorption,  in
which attention is fully captured by a series of
dynamically changing and often short-lived im-
ages; “the hypnagogic state blurs the boundar-
ies between inside and outside, self and world”
(p. 124).
This description coincides nicely with my
own theoretical work on dreaming. Elsewhere, I
have argued that the analysis of self-experience
is the key towards understanding not just differ-
ent  types  of  dreaming  (Windt 2010,  2015,
chap.s  11  and  12),  but  also  the  relationship
between  dreaming  and  waking  experience.  In
this view, the common denominator underlying
different  types  of  dreams,  such  as  lucid  and
nonlucid dreams, but also nightmares and false
awakenings is their immersive quality. Even in
simple forms of dreaming, there is still a sense
of presence, a phenomenal here, or the sense of
being located at  a  specific  point  in  space,  as
well as a sense of duration centered on a phe-
nomenal  now. This basic structure is preserved
even when the features that characterize a ma-
jority of dreams, such as interaction with non-
self dream characters, objects, emotions, or even
visual  imagery  are  lost.  In  such  minimal
dreams, phenomenal selfhood takes the form of
pure spatiotemporal  self-location, arising inde-
pendently of  more complex forms of  phenom-
enal selfhood that involve the experience of be-
ing a thinking self and embodied agent. There
may even be the experience of phenomenal dis-
embodiment,  or  of  lacking  a  body,  and  the
dream self  may be experienced (and later de-
scribed) as an abstract, undefined volume of in-
determinate extension or even as an unextended
point in space. Even though this sense of identi-
fication with  a  phenomenal  here and  now in-
volves a drastically reduced form of phenomenal
selfhood,  it  is  still  sufficient  to  ground retro-
spective claims of having had a self in dream re-
ports. The basic structural feature of a self that
is experienced as distinct from and located at a
precise point within the world is preserved. To
be sure, the locus of self-location and self-identi-
fication is more fluid in dreams than in wakeful-
ness—the phenomenal here is subject to sudden
shifts, and sometimes, we identify with a dream
character or even a series of dream characters
that  are  quite  distinct  from  our  waking  self
(Rosen &  Sutton 2013). Yet, as long as there
still is a world experienced as distinct from the
self, at least a basic form of the self-other dis-
tinction continues to exist. 
Within  this  framework,  immersive  spati-
otemporal  hallucination,  or  self-location  with
respect to a largely nonveridical, spatiotemporal
reference frame, marks the cutoff line between
dreaming and nondreaming. It also helps isolate
and  empirically  ground  minimal  phenomenal
selfhood  (Blanke &  Metzinger 2009),  or  the
simplest conditions under which the experience
of being or having a self arises. Here, I would
like to suggest that this framework can be ex-
tended to dreamless sleep experience as well. A
very basic point is that we can now sharpen the
claim that dreamless sleep experience is a self-
less state. Within the present framework, in or-
der for dreamless sleep experience to count as
selfless, even the basic form of self-other distinc-
tion that underlies spatiotemporal self-location
must be lost. The next step is to consider the
spatial and the temporal characteristics of self-
location  independently  of  each  other  and  ask
whether  either  of  them,  considered  on  their
own, would be sufficient to give rise to phenom-
enal  selfhood.  An  affirmative  answer  would
mean that we had not yet identified the phe-
nomenal  signature  of  dreamless  sleep  experi-
ence; an even more simplified account would be
needed.
Considering the spatial  and temporal as-
pects of self-location separately, there seems to
be a strong conceptual  link between the phe-
nomenal here and the sense of being located in
and relative to a larger spatial expanse. A spa-
tial  reference  frame,  according  to  the  present
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theory, turns into an experienced world when it
is centered on a phenomenal here, which in turn
is identified as the self. The spatial variant of
presence thus seems to have the self,  or some
rudimentary form of self-other distinction, writ-
ten into it. Moreover, the attempt to conceive of
an  experience  characterized  by  a  phenomenal
here but  lacking  any  temporal  characteristics
whatsoever strains the limits of conceivability.
Speaking of an experience that is both instant-
aneous,  lacking  any  temporal  extension,  and
fails  to have temporal location seems to be a
contradiction.  It  is  not  clear  how  this  could
count as an experience at all, and even less how
it could count as a reportable one.
By contrast, the phenomenal now does not
appear to carry the same conceptual commit-
ments. At least intuitively, the notion of a form
of temporal experience that is  independent of
and perhaps more basic than the experience of
being or  having a self  seems more acceptable
than that of an immersive but nonetheless self-
less  form of  spatial  experience.  Moreover,  we
can at least conceive, it would seem, of a phe-
nomenal now that fails to be differentiated from
or clearly located relative to a larger temporal
reference  frame.14 And  we  can  also,  it  would
seem,  conceive  of  an  experience  characterized
only by temporal but not by spatial character-
istics. Thinking, for instance, is not always ex-
perienced  as  having  spatial  location  (as  in
thoughts occurring in one’s  head), but it  cer-
tainly has temporal dynamics.15 Spatiality does
not  seem to be essential  to  phenomenality  in
quite the same way as temporality.
Note that I do not intend these conceptual
considerations to carry too much weight. In the
framework  I  am  working  towards,  conceptual
14 In  fact,  if  we  conceive  of  temporal  experience  as  involving  a
specious present, we might say that the phenomenal now simply
is  identical  with  a  rudimentary  form of  a  temporal  reference
frame. I return to this point later. Alternatively, if we conceive
of temporal experience as consisting of a series of unconnected
moments  that  themselves  have  no  temporal  extension,  then
again it would seem that each of these could occur in isolation
and  without  being  embedded  in  a  larger  temporal  reference
frame.
15 This phenomenological observation is reflected in the classical idea
that  the  mind cannot  be  spatially  located in  the  physical  world.
Mental states persist over time, but they do not have spatial charac-
teristics  such as  expansion or  separable  parts.  Perhaps,  this  phe-
nomenological  observation lies  at  the  root  of  metaphysical  claims
about the relationship between mind and body.
distinctions are informed by differences in the
structure  of  phenomenal  experience  and  such
differences should at least in principle be mem-
orable and describable, for instance in dream re-
ports or reports of dreamless sleep experience.16
I also think that the most empirically plausible
view will allow for gradual transitions between
states  involving  a  phenomenal  self  and  those
retrospectively  described  as  selfless;  and  the
same may also be true for the emergence of the
simplest forms of phenomenal experience. If this
is correct, then we should expect there to be a
certain  amount  of  uncertainty  when  dealing
with borderline  cases.  Where  exactly  to draw
the cutoff line for minimal phenomenal selfhood
in a given case may well  be hard (if  not im-
possible)  to  determine;  but  even so,  it  might
still be useful to introduce a conventional cutoff
line (for instance by saying that minimal phe-
nomenal selfhood involves both the spatial and
the  temporal  aspects  of  self-location)  if  this
helps pick out a theoretically meaningful trans-
ition in the structural features of experience and
guides future research in a constructive manner.
We will also expect such a theoretical concep-
tion to be reasonably well aligned with the way
such experiences are described in retrospective
reports.17 I think that both types of considera-
tions  support  the  claim  that  spatiotemporal
self-location can be meaningfully described as a
minimal  form  of  phenomenal  selfhood,  or  at
least  as  a  theoretically salient  point  of  trans-
ition on the trajectory from states described as
16 This is not to deny that experiences (or qualitative aspects of ex -
periences) could exist that are beneath the cutoff line of memor-
ability  and reportability.  Certain  subtle  aspects  of  phenomenal
experience, such as hues of color, do seem to outrun our ability
to  categorize  and  reidentify  them  over  time  (Raffman 1995).
Here, I am only claiming that such subtle aspects of experience
are not candidates for the report-based type of scientific investig-
ation I am interested in here. 
17 This is a prediction, and different subjects may mean different things
when they  describe  an experience  as  selfless.  For  some this  may
mean an  experience  characterized  by  spatiotemporal  self-location,
but in which they had the experience of being a disembodied entity
(cf. Windt 2015, chap. 7); others may describe episodes characterized
only by their temporal features as involving a self. There is also the
familiar problem that reports of selfless experiences easily slip into a
performative self-contradiction, of the type “I had a dream in which
I was not present”; such episodes are clearly remembered and repor-
ted by someone. But we should not expect the folk-psychological use
of terms such as “I” or “self” to align perfectly with a particular
technical definition. This is a good example of where specific inter-
view questions  might  increase  the  expressive  granularity  of  retro-
spective reports. 
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selfless to states involving self-experience in a
fuller sense. By contrast, the phenomenal  now,
when it arises independently of spatial self-loca-
tion, is a candidate for a structural feature of
phenomenal experience that provides the condi-
tions of possibility for self-experience but that
when occurring on its own is still prior to it. I
would like to suggest, then, that pure subjective
temporality is a candidate for minimal phenom-
enal experience;  it  is  a condition for but still
more basic than minimal phenomenal selfhood.
It can be described as subjective only because it
involves phenomenal experience; yet, it does not
involve the additional experience of being a self,
or a separate entity having the experience.18
There is, of course, a rich philosophical de-
bate on the nature of time experience, as well as
a  large  empirical  discussion  (for  an  introduc-
tion, see Dainton 2010; Arstila 2014; LePoidevin
2015). I cannot begin to do justice to this liter-
ature here, but want only to focus on one spe-
cific aspect. This is the idea, which we find in
William James  as  well  as  in  Husserlian  phe-
nomenology,  but  also  in  the  neuroscience  of
time  consciousness  (see  for  instance  Pöppel
2003), that even the smallest unit of temporal
experience,  the  temporal  now,  is  extended
rather than instantaneous.19 Following this con-
18 Note that this is related to a terminological difficulty that is implicit in
the Indian debate, as well as in Thompson’s reconstruction of it. As
noted earlier, both sides in the Indian debate assumed the self to persist
throughout sleep; they merely disagreed whether the self is necessarily
conscious. My proposal that we redescribe dreamless sleep experience in
terms of pure subjective temporality captures this idea that the self per-
sists in a thin sense even when awareness of any intentional contents is
lost. At the same time, recall that dreamless sleep experience is thought
to be characterized by a collapse of subject-object duality and by an ab-
sence of any intentional objects of awareness. In this state, nothing, in-
cluding the self, is thought to be known or cognized. There is no longer
an individual, consciously experienced first-person perspective. It is this
thicker and more substantial notion of a self experienced as distinct from
other objects or persons that I propose is lost in dreamless sleep experi-
ence; the persistence of such a self would mean that there would still be
an intentional object of awareness, and thus would indicate a more com-
plex state than that characterized in the Indian debate as dreamless
sleep experience.
19 This could, of course, turn out to be false. Even if the underlying
neural representations are temporally extended, the same may not be
true of conscious states themselves; these may still be conceived of as
elementary and momentary events lacking spatial or temporal struc-
ture. For a recent defense of such a view, inspired by the Abhid-
harma doctrine of momentariness,  see  Chadha (forthcoming).  Yet,
even if the experience of continuity and persistence over time turned
out to be an illusion, this would still be an interesting structural fea-
ture of phenomenal experience. For present purposes, the basic phe-
nomenological claim, according to which the phenomenal now is tem-
porally stretched rather than momentary and discrete, is enough.
ception, a rudimentary form of duration would
be intrinsic to the phenomenal now; and neuros-
cientific work seems to suggest that this tem-
poral now is itself variable (Wykowska & Arstila
2014). The window of simultaneity, or the max-
imum  time-frame  within  which  two  different
events  are  experienced  as  occurring  now,  is
modality-specific. The cutoff line for two stimuli
being  experienced  as  simultaneous  is,  for  in-
stance, larger for visual stimuli than for audit-
ory ones. As Wykowska & Arstila (2014, p. 443)
note, 
it might be that a relatively broad window
of simultaneity is actually beneficial. The
human brain needs to exhibit some degree
of tolerance to asynchronous stimuli in or-
der to be able to bind different sensory in-
puts into one event. The window of simul-
taneity can be seen as an integration win-
dow for stimuli and, as such, is a necessary
mechanism for binding signals from differ-
ent  pathways  into  one  single  object  or
event.
Human  temporal  resolution  is  flexible,  it  is
easily affected by attentional processes as well
as  by  training  and  expertise  (Wykowska &
Arstila 2014).  Duration  perception  might  be
state-dependent as well, showing characteristic
changes in altered states of consciousness and
psychiatric  disorders  (Noreika et  al. 2014);
and perhaps the same is true for the degree to
which the experienced  now itself  is  stretched
in time. There also seems to be a close rela-
tionship  between  changes  in  time  perception
and  alterations  in  self-experience.  When  the
self becomes the focus of attention, when we
attend  to  our  current  mental  or  emotional
state, or to bodily sensations (such as hunger
or  pain),  time  seems  to  slow down;  by con-
trast, when we are thoroughly absorbed in an
activity,  time  contracts  and  seems  to  move
faster (Wittmann in press). When self-experi-
ence is lost, as in selfless states, the loss of a
reference  point  may be  associated  with  feel-
ings of timelessness (Wittmann in press); the
phenomenal  now is  stretched  indefinitely.
There is a sense of duration, but the sense of
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succession,  of  there being a chain of  present
moments, has been lost.
Importantly,  this  way  of  thinking  about
subjective temporality and the experienced now
is one which Thompson (2015) endorses. He ex-
plicitly appeals to the Husserlian conception of
time experience in his defense of retrospective
reports of dreamless sleep experience. Here, he
suggests that memories of dreamless sleep ex-
perience may be grounded by retentional aware-
ness, “the holding onto the just-past as an in-
tentional content belonging to our consciousness
of  the  passage  of  time,  including  our  mental
lives as flowing in time” (p. 9). Because tem-
poral experience has the retention of the imme-
diate past and protention, or the anticipation of
the next moment, written into it, the moment
after awakening still carries with it the traces of
dreamless  sleep  experience:  “Immediately,  the
ego sense appropriates the lingering impression
or retention of not-knowing and associates this
retention with itself, thereby generating the ret-
rospective thought, ‘I did not know anything’”
(p. 10). 
In  Mind  in  Life,  Thompson (2010)  en-
dorses a version of Husserl’s conception of time-
consciousness according to which the streaming,
flowing  character  of  subjective  experience  is
both  the  “condition  of  possibility  for  every
other  kind  of  consciousness,  but  is  not  itself
made possible by some other, still deeper level
of consciousness” (p. 324). This absolute flow of
consciousness is self-constituting (p. 324); it is
also prior to and essential for phenomenal self-
hood. As Thompson (2010) puts it, 
to be aware of phenomena across time, con-
sciousness must be retentionally and proten-
tionally aware of itself across time. Therefore,
time-consciousness  entails  prereflective  self-
awareness.  In  other  words,  our  being  con-
scious of external temporal phenomena entails
that our temporally enduring experiences of
those phenomena are self—aware. Inner time-
consciousness  is  thus  nothing  other  than
prereflective self-awareness. (p. 328)
This prereflective awareness that consciousness
has of itself (its self-luminousness, reflexivity, or
self-acquaintance20) is not yet the same has be-
ing or  having a phenomenal  self  in  the sense
used here.  Rather,  this  minimal  form of  phe-
nomenal  experience  is  the  condition  for  the
emergence of minimal phenomenal selfhood.
My suggestion, then, is that we can enrich
our theoretical conception of dreamless sleep ex-
perience  by  applying  Thompson’s  account  of
how  we  remember dreamless  sleep  experience
(namely with the help of retentional awareness)
to the description of dreamless sleep experience
itself. Dreamless sleep experience involves pure
subjective temporality that is not yet structured
around intentional objects, including a phenom-
enal  self.  As  Thompson (2015)  puts  it,  “al-
though deep sleep creates a gap or a rupture in
our consciousness, we often feel the gap immedi-
ately upon awakening. […] We are aware of the
gap from within our consciousness” (p. 4). Just
as upon awakening, I am directly aware that it
was I who was asleep and unknowing, I am typ-
ically aware that a certain (though perhaps in-
definite) amount of time has passed. Following
Proust’s more poetic formulation in the passage
quoted by Thompson, 
a  sleeping  man holds  in  a  circle  around
him the sequence of the hours, the order of
the years and world. He consults them in-
stinctively as he wakes and reads in them
in a second the point on the earth he oc-
cupies, the time that has elapsed up to his
20 Again, there are subtle terminological differences. For instance, Wil-
liford (2015a, pp. 10-11; see also Williford 2015b) writes that reflex-
ivity  or  self-acquaintance  is  “an essential  structural  feature  of  all
consciousness; and I take it to be a phenomenological datum. All
streams of consciousness are immediately aware of themselves, and
that is the foundation of all other forms of self-representation, auto-
biographical cognition, and so on. This reflexivity is subjective char-
acter (for-me-ness), but it is a mistake to turn this structural feature
into a kind of entity or homunculus.”
My account is compatible with much of what Williford says here; I
agree that we are considering a basic and essential feature of con-
scious experience, and one that should not lead us to posit an inde-
pendent entity that is  identified as the self.  Yet,  I think there is
room for phenomenal selfhood as a structural feature of experience
over and above the reflexivity of even the simplest kinds of phenom-
enal states. Even readers who disagree with my description of this as
a form of phenomenal selfhood might still agree that the target prop-
erty of spatiotemporal self-location is distinct from the more basic
reflexivity of consciousness. Adopting the conceptual convention of
describing this as a form of self-experience does not, I take it, require
us to reify the self or to slip into a homuncular view, but simply of-
fers a conceptual tool for describing the way we experience ourselves
as being or having a self.
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waking; but their ranks can be mixed up,
broken. (p. 3)21 
We might even say that metaphorically speak-
ing, subjective temporality provides a reference
frame that is still empty, but poised to integrate
and lend temporal structure to intentional con-
tents such as thoughts, objects and events, but
also the self, as they arise—for instance by im-
posing sequential order on them and represent-
ing some of them as simultaneous, and others as
successive. Yet, this form of temporality is more
basic than the events it later integrates; it pred-
ates them and provides a space in which they
can appear. 
Incidentally,  this  idea  fits  in  nicely  with
the Vedantan view that, “deep sleep is a kind of
‘ground state’ of consciousness, a lowest-energy
state from which the ‘excited states’ of dream-
ing  and  waking  arise”  (Thompson 2014,  pp.
260-261). Again, deep sleep is the baseline, the
causal source from which other conscious states
arise; it is also called “seed sleep”, because it is
thought to contain the seeds of both dreaming
and waking consciousness. Perhaps we can be-
gin to make sense of this idea by saying that
dreamless sleep experience, understood as pure
subjective temporality, is a candidate for min-
imal phenomenal experience.22
21 A prediction that seems implicit in Proust’s observation that if we are
suddenly overcome by sleep, we no longer know what time it is upon
awakening, is that dreamless sleep experience may bear an interesting re-
lation to the ability to estimate how long one has slept. Perhaps, inter-
mittent periods of dreamless sleep experience even ground our awareness
that some time has passed or are responsible for the ability, which may
be more pronounced in certain subjects, to awaken just before the alarm
clock goes off (thanks to Valdas Noreika for pointing this out). By con-
trast, if we awaken from a state lacking any form of phenomenal experi-
ence whatsoever—as in some forms of anesthesia—there may be no sense
of a preceding temporal gap and a more profound sense of temporal dis-
orientation. At present, this is, of course, entirely speculative, but it
might be a question worth asking. 
22 The temporally dynamic nature of experience is also of central im-
portance for understanding the neural correlates of conscious experi-
ence. As Melloni (2015) points out, while the mechanisms for updat-
ing the contents of consciousness have been investigated by numerous
studies, the mechanisms underlying the maintenance or the flow of
conscious  experience  fall  outside  the  scope  of  most  existing
paradigms. She also proposes that the temporal flow of consciousness
is a fundamental property of experience and an important target—
perhaps  the  most  important  target—for  future  research  on  the
neural correlates of consciousness. Similarly, Noreika (2015) suggests
that focusing on the analysis of individual contents of consciousness,
as is standardly done in mainstream research on the neural correlates
of consciousness, misses the temporality of consciousness; instead, to
make progress toward understanding this more fundamental  prop-
erty, he proposes contrasting conscious and nonconsciousness states. 
How can we make progress on identifying
real-world cases of dreamless sleep experience?
Importantly, if  the account of  dreamless sleep
experience defended here is even remotely cor-
rect, we should not expect dreamless sleep ex-
perience to be restricted to experienced medit-
ators. Instead, dreamless sleep experience might
be fairly prevalent even in people without any
formal  training  in  contemplative  traditions.
This approach requires disambiguating between
at least two variants of the target phenomenon.
Note  that  within  the  Indian  conception  of
dreamless sleep, we can distinguish between an
insight component and a more basic experiential
component. The insight component refers to the
ability  to  become aware,  during  sleep,  of  the
nature of this state.  This is  not necessarily a
conceptually mediated form of knowing that you
are  currently  sleeping  dreamlessly,  but  rather
consists “in being able to witness the state of
dreamless sleep and recall its phenomenal clar-
ity upon awakening” (Thompson 2015, p. 15).
Still, even this nonconceptual form of witnessing
is not epistemically neutral, but can lead (or fail
to lead) to veridical retrospective reports. To be
sure, this form of insight or awareness itself can
have a particular phenomenal feel—it bears the
phenomenal signature of knowing (Metzinger &
Windt 2014,  2015),  the feeling of  just  having
become aware  of  the  nature  of  one’s  ongoing
state—but importantly, this type of phenomenal
experience  carries  with  it  epistemic  commit-
ments.  My feeling of  knowing can be  true or
false.  It  also  seems plausible,  as  suggested by
Thompson, that meditation facilitates this type
of lucid dreamless state, or perhaps could even
be a way of inducing it systematically. 
But the model of dreamless sleep experi-
ence as pure subjective temporality also points
to a more basic experiential component that as
such  bears  no  obvious  connection  to  an  epi-
stemic state of knowing or of being aware of the
nature  of  the state one is  currently  experien-
cing. Dreamless sleep experience in this primary
phenomenological reading refers to a kind of ex-
perience during sleep; but this does not require
the ability to conceptualize  this  as  a form of
sleep  experience.  In  principle,  you  can  have
dreamless  sleep  experience  without  realizing
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that you are asleep: dreamless sleep experience
is a form of experience occurring in sleep, but it
is  not  necessarily  an experience of  sleep  as a
state of sleep. It  might enable us to estimate
how long we have slept, but it can also be mis-
leading,  maybe  even  leading  us  to  misjudge
whether we have slept at all.  This is particu-
larly  obvious  if  dreamless  sleep  experience  is
construed as an answer to the question of how
we know, upon awakening, that we slept peace-
fully (Thompson 2015, p. 4). Thompson’s recon-
struction of the Indian debate, taken together
with  my  analysis,  suggests  that  because  this
state is characterized only by its temporal char-
acter, we have the sense of there being a gap
between  two  periods  of  wakefulness;  and  be-
cause this gap is devoid of intentional objects,
we describe it  as peaceful.  Yet,  this does not
seem to require that we were aware of (or took
ourselves  to  be  aware  of)  the  nature  of  this
state  while  it  was  occurring,  namely  during
sleep. If any sophisticated epistemological read-
ing of insight were indeed crucial to dreamless
sleep experience, the experience of having slept
peacefully would have to be reserved for special
subject groups, such as experienced meditators
—and it would be quite mysterious why clearly,
it is not. 
Perhaps  we  can  model  the  relationship
between  the  epistemic  and  the  phenomenolo-
gical components of dreamless sleep experience
on the relationship between lucid and nonlucid
dreaming.  Thompson (2015, p. 15) himself ex-
plicitly  contrasts  lucid  dreaming,  or  knowing
that you are dreaming while you are dreaming,
with lucid dreamless sleep. Given this sugges-
tion, a good place to begin the project of broad-
ening the investigation of dreamless sleep exper-
ience beyond expert  meditators  is  to consider
reports from experienced lucid dreamers. 
5 Candidates for pure subjective 
temporality during sleep
5.1 From lucid dreaming to lucid 
dreamless sleep?
Lucidity is commonly defined as awareness that
one is dreaming while one is dreaming (for ex-
cellent  reviews,  see  Voss &  Hobson 2015;
Dresler et al. in press). Often, this is associated
with an ability to control not just one’s own ac-
tions in the dream, but also the course of the
dream, the actions of non-self dream characters,
etc.  In  particular,  lucid  dreamers  can  signal
that  they  have  now become lucid  by  making
prearranged patterns of eye movements, such as
looking right – left – right – left within their
dream.  These  gaze  shifts  correspond  to  the
movements  of  their  physical  eyes  and can be
identified  on  the  electrooculogram.  This  tech-
nique of  signal-verified lucid dreaming enables
researchers  to  identify  the  precise  period  of
sleep  during  which  certain  actions  were  per-
formed during a lucid dream and potentially to
identify  their  electrophysiological  and  neural
correlates (Dresler et al. 2011,  2012). Lucidity
can occur spontaneously, but a number of meth-
ods for inducing lucidity are discussed in the lit-
erature (Stumbrys et al. 2012). There have even
been suggestions and attempts to experiment-
ally  induce  dream  lucidity  through  electrical
stimulation  (Noreika et  al. 2010a;  Voss et  al.
2014;  Voss &  Hobson 2015). While still  in its
early stages, this work clearly shows that lucid-
ity is a robust phenomenon; and combined with
the ability to control the dream as it unfolds, it
makes  laboratory  studies  of  lucid  dreaming
compelling.
One  reason for  being  interested  in  lucid
dreams within the present context are reports of
lucid  dreams describing  a  loss  of  phenomenal
embodiment,  or  even  a dissolution of  the self
(see  Windt 2015, chap.s 7,  11 for discussion).
Some of these appear to fulfill the requirements
for  minimal  phenomenal  selfhood  described
earlier:  in  so-called  imageless  lucid  dreams
(Magallón 1991;  Bogzaran 2003;  Hurd 2008),
self-identification  may be  relative  to  a  disem-
bodied point in space and can arise independ-
ently of bodily sensations and even of visual im-
agery  (see  also  LaBerge &  DeGracia 2000).
While most of these reports, so far, are anec-
dotal, it is tempting to think that lucid dreams
could be used to systematically investigate the
transition from minimal phenomenal selfhood to
more complex forms of self-experience involving
the experience of being a thinking self and em-
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bodied agent. Importantly, according to some of
these reports, even this basic sense of self-identi-
fication and location within a larger spatial ex-
panse can be lost. I would like to suggest that
such cases  may involve a shift  from a simple
form of lucid dreaming involving minimal phe-
nomenal selfhood to lucid dreamless  sleep ex-
perience. Here is a single example: 
I  am suspended in space—dream space, I
think. There is nothing here, just millions of
greyish  dots  and  I  am  one  of  the  dots,
there’s no dream-body anymore, I’m just a
dot  [of]  pure  consciousness  suspended.  A
feeling of great peace comes over me and a
sense of gentle, infinite expansion. It’s as if
everything and nothing are the same thing
and there is a sense of effortless belonging.
As the sense of expansion increases I am no
longer a single dot of consciousness; all the
dots are me and I am them. There’s no “I”
or “them.” We are one. There’s just a bliss-
ful sense of timelessness and oneness and a
merging with the light. After an indefinable
length of time, I start to feel the weight of
my body in bed,  and settle  back into it,
tingling  all  over.  (Clare  Johnson,  unpub-
lished dream report, March 19, 1995)
If we take the report at face value, it describes
a gradual transition from minimal phenomenal
selfhood, characterized by phenomenally disem-
bodied  spatiotemporal  self-location,  to  selfless
experience. This transition is accompanied by a
sense  of  spatial  expansion,  in  the  course  of
which the sense of the self as distinct from the
environment  is  lost.  To the extent  that  there
still  is  a sense of spatial  self-location, this no
longer involves the experience of being located
relative  to  something  else.  There  is  also  a
change in the temporal structure of experience,
almost as if  the experiential present, the phe-
nomenal  now,  had been  stretched indefinitely.
The period following the dissolution of the self
is still experienced as having duration, but this
duration is indefinable and no longer structured
around  any  events.23 Following  Metzinger
23 A similar link between the dissolution of the self and the experience
of timelessness, or of an indefinite duration, may exist in deep medit-
(2013), we might want to describe this as in-
volving  a  transition  from  a  minimal  unit  of
identification, in which an unextended point in
space is described as the locus of the self, to a
maximal unit of identification. In such cases of
“pure  consciousness”,  he suggests,  the unit  of
identification is
the  most  general  phenomenal  property
available  for  identification  at  all:  Philo-
sophers might call it the global “unity of
consciousness”,  or  phenomenality  per  se,
or awareness as such, namely the singular,
integrated,  all-pervading  quality  of  con-
sciousness characterizing the current total-
ity of experiential contents, as it is given
in  every  single  moment  of  experience.
(Metzinger 2013, p. 5)
I  would  like  to  suggest  that  we  can  now  be
more precise.  The moment at which self-loca-
tion dissolves—or at which minimal phenomenal
selfhood is replaced with the maximum unit of
identification—involves a transition to the type
of  pure  subjective  temporality  that  earlier,  I
suggested  might  be  the  phenomenal  mark  of
dreamless sleep experience. As lucid dreaming
gives way to lucid dreamless sleep experience,
minimal phenomenal selfhood shades into pure
phenomenality, in which phenomenal experience
is characterized only by its temporal structure. I
find it  telling that according to Johnson’s re-
port, this latter part of the episode appears to
strain the limits of reportability, and also that
despite its indefiniteness, the experience is de-
scribed as blissful;  again, this is exactly what
the  Indian  focus  on  the  experience  of  having
slept peacefully would lead us to expect. 
Clearly,  this  single  dream report  presents
anecdotal evidence at best; still, I would like to
suggest that a first step towards extending the in-
vestigation of dreamless sleep experience beyond
experienced meditators might be to investigate
imageless  lucid  dreams  in  experienced  lucid
dreamers. What makes me cautiously optimistic
is that lucidity is often described as a very un-
stable phenomenon, as involving a balancing act
ative states (Berkovich-Ohana et al. 2013), but also, for instance, in
drug-induced altered states of consciousness (Wittmann in press).
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between maintaining lucid insight (rather than
slipping back into a nonlucid dream or awaken-
ing) and remaining engaged enough in the ongo-
ing dream to prevent  it  from dissolving com-
pletely  (Brooks &  Vogelsong 2000).  Lucid
dreamers often describe that imagery can take
on a faded, washed out quality, or that lucidity
is followed by a period of darkness or, alternat-
ively, of light; indeed, this may be why such re-
ports often slip into mystical  language to de-
scribe  such experiences.  Here,  I  want only  to
suggest that in such cases, the unwanted fading
of lucid dream imagery may actually be an op-
portunity  for  experimentally  investigating  the
transition to dreamless sleep experience.24 
Before moving on, I want to suggest that
the comparison between lucid dreaming and lu-
cid  dreamless  sleep  is  also  interesting  for  an-
other reason. This is that as is the case for non-
lucid dreams, there continue to be a number of
conceptual uncertainties about how to define lu-
cid dreaming and whether to describe it as a
genuine sleep phenomenon or as a hybrid state
between REM sleep and wakefulness (Voss et al.
2009;  for  a  discussion  of  lucidity  and  insight
from  a  philosophical  perspective,  see  Kühle
2015; see  Voss 2015 for a criticial reply). Also,
while  some  authors  consider  any  dream  in-
volving  insight  into  the  fact  that  one  is  now
dreaming as lucid, others reserve the term lucid-
ity for cases in which there is a marked increase
in the overall vividness of multimodal imagery
as  well  as  a  shift  towards  wake-like  cognitive
activity, including the ability to engage in ra-
tional thought, full recall of waking life, and in-
sight into the fact that none of the events oc-
curring within the dream have any real-world
consequences (for a first attempt to test these
different conceptions of lucidity experimentally,
see Voss et al. 2013).
On the conception that I favor, lucidity is
not necessarily accompanied by an all-pervading
change  in  the  phenomenal  character  of  the
dream; rather, lucid dreams are gradually dis-
tinguished from nonlucid ones along a number
24 Similarly, in the tradition of dream and sleep yoga, dream lucidity is
sometimes described as  a preliminary stage of becoming aware of
sleep; again, realizing that one is dreaming precedes the dissolution
of dream imagery while maintaining awareness of dreamless sleep.
See for instance Wangyal & Dahlby (1998).
of dimensions (Windt &  Metzinger 2007;  Nor-
eika et al. 2010a; Voss et al. 2013). While labor-
atory studies, because of their reliance on sig-
nal-verified  lucid  dreams,  necessarily  focus  on
lucid  dreams  involving  at  least  some form of
control, the conceptually mediated insight into
the fact that one is now dreaming is orthogonal
to the other experiential qualities of dreaming.
Insight is also necessary to score a given report
as  describing  a  lucid  dream—but  aside  from
this methodological fact, the ability to concep-
tualize one’s ongoing experience as a dream—to
have the  thought  “I  am now dreaming”—can
coexist  alongside  the  types  of  vivid,  often
bizarre  and  emotionally  charged  imagery  and
erratic reasoning that characterize a majority of
nonlucid dreams as  well.  Lucidity can be  the
outcome of  a conscious inference (of  the type
“this cannot be happening, so I must be dream-
ing”), but often appears to be driven by a sud-
den feeling, sometimes described by saying that
the dream suddenly took on a dreamlike feel or
a hyperreal character (see Windt 2015, chap. 9
for details and further references). Perhaps, this
precursor to full, conceptually mediated lucidity
is similar to the type of nonconceptual aware-
ness that is thought to accompany lucid dream-
less sleep experience as well. This suggests two
further questions. The first is whether nonlucid
forms  of  dreamless  sleep  experience  exist  as
well. The second is whether in dreamless sleep
experience,  anything  analogous  to  prelucid
dreams exists. I discuss these in turn.
5.2 From white dreams to nonlucid 
dreamless sleep experience?
Again, we can approach the project of identify-
ing candidates for nonlucid dreamless sleep ex-
perience by asking whether instances of minimal
phenomenal selfhood exist in nonlucid dreams.
If so, we could once more expect these to occur
in the vicinity of minimal phenomenal experi-
ence during dreamless sleep. 
A possible candidate for such a state are
so-called white dream reports, in which subjects
describe the impression of having experienced a
dream but are unable to describe it in any de-
tail. It seems plausible that a subgroup of white
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dream reports can be explained by forgetting.
Especially where the subject describes the dis-
tinct feeling of having had a complex dream but
being unable to remember it in any detail, this
would seem to be the most plausible interpreta-
tion. There is  some reason for thinking,  how-
ever, that this may not be the case for all re-
ports of white dreaming. In at least some cases,
the impression of having had some kind of ex-
perience prior to awakening, coupled with an in-
ability to describe any particular aspects of the
experience,  such  as  any  specific  forms  of  im-
agery or narrative contents, might not be an ar-
tifact of forgetting, but might reflect the struc-
ture of the experience itself. At least a subset of
white  dreams  might  involve  a  sense  of  spati-
otemporal self-location, or minimal phenomenal
selfhood, arising in an otherwise imageless non-
lucid dream. And if this were supported by fu-
ture studies, then it might even make sense to
ask  whether  perhaps,  a  further  subgroup  of
white dreams could more properly be described
as  involving  nonlucid  dreamless  sleep  experi-
ence.  In  the  current  framework,  these  latter
types  of  white  dreams  would  not  count  as
proper dreams at all: they would be instances of
pure  subjective  temporality  arising  independ-
ently of the spatial aspects of self-location and
self-identification. They would involve a form of
minimal phenomenal experience that could no
longer be described as minimal phenomenal self-
hood, and thus as a dream. Perhaps, we occa-
sionally really do retain some awareness, after
awakening,  of  phenomenal  experience  having
persisted during sleep. And perhaps, unable to
remember any specific details, we then assimil-
ate them to more familiar types of experiences,
labeling them as white dreams.
Again, all of this is still extremely specu-
lative and everything I have said so far about
white dreams should be read, at best, as a care-
ful prediction of what we might say in light of
future findings. In particular, I do not mean to
suggest that white dream reports, or a subgroup
thereof, can already be regarded as examples of
dreamless sleep experience: I only mean to pro-
pose that they are an initially promising target
for  future  research  on  dreamless  sleep  experi-
ence. Still, these considerations fit in nicely with
the finding that white dreams are particularly
frequent  during slow-wave sleep.  According to
one  study,  awakenings  from  stages  2  and  3
NREM sleep  were  followed  by  roughly  equal
rates  of  dream  reports,  white  dream  reports,
and  reports  of  nondreaming  (Noreika et  al.
2009).  Their  occurrence  in  the  vicinity  of  re-
ports of dreaming and of nondreaming might in-
dicate  that  white  dream  reports  describe  a
transitional  state  between  the  two.  Moreover,
even dream reports obtained following awaken-
ings from these sleep stages were often static,
describing experiences lacking narrative progres-
sion as well as movement sensations (Noreika et
al. 2009,  2010b).  Participants  sometimes  de-
scribed the sense of  being present in  a static
scene,  as  in  quietly  sitting  on  a  bench,  with
nothing  else  happening  (Valdas  Noreika,  per-
sonal communication; see also Noreika 2014, p.
52). Even in the absence of narrative progres-
sion, there was still a sense of duration, and ac-
cording  to  subjective  estimates,  these  simple
dreams lasted between thirty seconds and one
minute. 
An interesting possibility could be to in-
vestigate the wording of white dream reports in
more detail. To my knowledge, this has not yet
been done. Maybe there are indeed subtle dif-
ferences in the wording of such reports, and per-
haps these would enable researchers to distin-
guish cases in which there is the impression of
having  forgotten  a  complex  dream from ones
describing imageless  and perhaps  even selfless
and objectless  episodes of  phenomenal  experi-
ence. Again, it might be possible to increase the
expressive granularity of reports with the help
of training or specific questionnaires, thus ren-
dering subtle phenomenological differences vis-
ible that would be otherwise overlooked. A pos-
sible finding could be that some of these experi-
ences involve a continued sense of presence and
self-location  in  an  abstract,  amodally  experi-
enced spatial expanse, whereas in others, even
this basic sense of self is lost and only the feel-
ing of duration, or of an indefinite temporal ex-
panse, is present. 
A particularly  promising  way to  do  this
would be to use a serial awakenings paradigm,
in  which  participants  are  awakened  multiple
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times throughout the night at intervals of 15-30
minutes, thus maximizing the number of reports
that  can  be  collected  throughout  the  night
(Noreika et al. 2009;  Siclari et al. 2014;  Siclari
et al. 2013). Questions focusing on the temporal
aspects  of  experience  could  then  be  used  to
identify those periods, if any, in which dream-
less sleep experience is most likely to occur. For
instance,  Siclari et al. (2013) asked their parti-
cipants  to  estimate  how  long  they  had  been
having  continuous  experiences  before  being
awakened, but also how long their most recent
experience  had  lasted,  how  far  back  in  time
they could recall any narrative events, and how
rich  and  complex  the  experience  was.  They
found that during stages N2 and N3, estimates
for duration,  recall  back in  time and richness
were low. Still, these results could be influenced,
in part, by the fact that the interview questions
focused on the objects of consciousness and on
narrative events. If the questions were reworded
in such a way as to cover dreamless sleep exper-
ience, the patterns of responses might change.
Even so,  it  is  interesting  to note that  during
sleep  onset,  there  was  a  dissociation  between
these measures, with participants estimating a
long duration of the last conscious experience,
but a low richness and ability to recall back in
time. At least, this suggests that the estimated
duration of conscious sleep states does not al-
ways map cleanly onto the ability to recall spe-
cific contents. For now, I want only to suggest
that  a  similar  strategy  could  interestingly  be
applied to the investigation of dreamless sleep
experience as well. 
This  is  also  attractive  in  view  of  the
goals of this line of research. Note that Siclari
et al. (2014) explicitly use the serial awaken-
ings  paradigm  to  contrast  the  presence  and
absence of conscious experience independently
of task performance and within the same sleep
stage (for a similar suggestion, see Noreika et
al. 2009;  Noreika 2015), the ultimate aim be-
ing to identify the task- and state-independent
neural correlates of conscious experience. For
this project, dreamless sleep experience, as a
candidate for minimal phenomenal experience
during sleep, is clearly a relevant target phe-
nomenon. 
5.3 From subjective insomnia to unwitting
expertise of dreamless sleep 
experience? 
The final example that I wish to discuss is sleep
misperception in subjective (or paradoxical, as
it is also sometimes called) insomnia. The term
objective insomnia, reserved for patients suffer-
ing  from  actual  sleep  loss  as  conventionally
measured, is sometimes contrasted with subject-
ive insomnia, which refers to subjects who sys-
tematically underestimate the time they actu-
ally spend asleep (Harvey & Tang 2012;  Perlis
et al. 1997). This mismatch between subjective
sleep perception and objective measures of sleep
sometimes leads to a trivialization of subjective
insomnia—and  the  suggestion  that  their  dia-
gnosis as insomniacs is somehow not “real” can
be experienced as infuriating by those afflicted
by  it  (Greene 2008).  Subjective  insomnia  is
clearly not an imaginary problem, but a cause
of real suffering. In fact, patients with subject-
ive  insomnia  may  experience  more  severe
impairments  in  cognitive  functioning  than  in-
somnia patients who do not underestimate the
amount of sleep they are getting. Furthermore,
worrying about getting enough asleep may pre-
cede actual sleep loss, and patients who under-
estimate the time they spend asleep may still be
suffering from a real sleep deficit as well (Har-
vey 2002; Harvey & Tang 2012). The distinction
between subjective and objective insomnia has
also been questioned, as sleep-state mispercep-
tion may be prevalent in different subtypes of
insomnia.  As  Harvey &  Tang (2012)  put  it,
“many patients with insomnia perceive sleep as
wake, systematically overestimate the time they
take to get to sleep (SOL) and underestimate
the time they sleep in total (TST).” This fur-
ther highlights the urgency of sleep-state mis-
perception existing alongside actual sleep loss in
insomnia. 
In the  context  of  the  present  discussion,
the example of sleep-state misperception in sub-
jective  insomnia  may  seem  to  be  a  counter-
example to, rather than a candidate for, dream-
less  sleep  experience.  Thompson (2015,  p.  5)
considers sleep-state misperception as a possible
objection to his view: sleep-state misperception
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of the type seen in insomnia challenges the reli-
ability  of  subjective  reports  of  sleep,  thus
providing a counterexample to his claim that at
other times, reports of dreamless sleep experi-
ence and of having slept peacefully are veridical
memory reports. He then argues that the mere
possibility  of  there  being  veridical  reports  of
dreamless sleep experience is enough to disprove
the default view. He also proposes that in ex-
perienced  meditators,  “we  should  observe  a
stronger correlation between subjective reports
of phenomenal qualities of sleep and various ob-
jective measures of brain activity” (p. 16). The
fact that at other times, subjective evaluations
of sleep can go wrong does not contradict this
view, but merely shows that the investigation of
dreamless sleep experience is best restricted to
certain subject groups. 
Here, I want to suggest that an alternative
interpretation  of  sleep-state  misperception  is
possible. In this alternative view, patients with
subjective  insomnia  are  in  fact  unwitting  ex-
perts of various kinds of sleep experience. It is
merely in conceptualizing their sleep states as
occurring  in  wakefulness  that  they  go  wrong.
Yet, this is compatible with saying that during
sleep, they maintain prereflective awareness of
their  ongoing sleep state;  in fact,  it might be
their  continued perception of  sleep  that  leads
them to mischaracterize it as a state of wakeful-
ness, rather than as sleep. Their expertise, con-
sequently, is of a somewhat paradoxical nature:
they have a high-degree of familiarity with their
sleep, they observe and perhaps even compuls-
ively attend to it—but they don’t recognize or
conceptualize it as sleep.
Note that this description fits in well with
the distinction, introduced at the end of section
5.1, between different readings of the term lu-
cidity. There, I argued that prereflective aware-
ness of the fact that one is now dreaming often
precedes the conceptually mediated insight that
characterizes  full-blown  lucidity.  Importantly,
these  two  factors  may  even  be  dissociable:  a
fleeting  awareness  of  the  dreamlike  nature  of
one’s  current  state  can  be  misinterpreted,  on
the  level  of  conscious,  conceptually  mediated
thought,  as  indicating  that  one  is  awake.  In
such prelucid dreams, the erroneous conclusion
that one is certainly awake may be prompted by
the same type of change in experiential charac-
ter that in other cases drives the cognitive real-
ization  that  this  is  a  dream (see  also  Windt
2015, chap. 9).25 
Similarly, the idea is that sleep-state mis-
perception  arises  when  patients  misinterpret
mental activity and phenomenal experience that
in fact occurs in sleep as occurring in wakeful-
ness.  Indeed,  Mercer et  al. (2002)  found that
when they were awakened 5 minutes after the
onset of stage 2 sleep or REM sleep, insomnia
patients were more likely than good sleepers to
say they had been awake. One possibility is that
these  patients  generally  have  a  heightened
awareness of sleep-related experiences;  another
is that increased attention to and concern about
the amount of sleep they are getting may in-
crease their sensitivity to such sleep-related ex-
periences,  as  well  as  the  likelihood  of  mis-
describing them as occurring in wakefulness. 
Interestingly,  it  does not  seem that  sub-
jective insomnia simply results from a general
deficit in the ability to estimate time (Tang &
Harvey 2005). Instead, subjective insomnia ap-
pears to be associated with selective attention
to  and  increased  monitoring  of  external  cues
(such as the time of day or the alarm clock),
but also of thoughts and bodily sensations that
are  taken,  by  the  subject,  to  be  inconsistent
with sleep. As Mercer et al. (2002, p. 565) put
it, “insomniacs’ reduced sleep-wake discriminab-
ility may be caused by either a greater amount
of mentation during sleep, mentation that more
25 This is also why such examples of prelucid dreams or of sleep-state
misperception do not threaten the transparency of retrospective re-
ports. In the present framework, reports are transparent with respect
to the occurrence and phenomenal character of experience only; but
we should not expect them to accurately reflect the sleep state in
which the respective experiences occurred (or indeed whether they
occurred in sleep at all), just as we should not expect them to accur-
ately identify the underlying changes in neural activation patterns.
Perhaps training, as Thompson (2015) suggests, can indeed improve
the match between subjective experience reports and objective meas-
ures of sleep states or of brain activation; but this is in no way guar-
anteed. Or perhaps, objective measures of sleep should be informed
by the conditions under which different subject groups experience
themselves as being asleep. A mismatch between subjective and ob-
jective measures need not indicate a flaw in subjective reports;  it
might also indicate that objective sleep measures are poorly suited to
capture  what  normal,  healthy subjects  mean when they say they
have been asleep. Indeed, this latter suggestion is in keeping with
Thompson’s proposal of a phenomenologically enriched taxonomy of
sleep states.
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closely resembles awake mentation, or a misat-
tribution  of  normal  nocturnal  mentation  as
wakeful  cognitive  activity.”  Enhanced  memory
processing may also  play a role  (Perlis et  al.
1997), as might enhanced physiological and cor-
tical  arousal.  Intriguingly,  insomnia  patients
show heightened beta and gamma EEG activity
during  sleep  onset,  but  also  during  NREM
sleep; and in one study, this activity was negat-
ively associated with their ability to correctly
perceive that they had been asleep (Perlis et al.
2001). Again, this could be an indication of con-
tinued  awareness  during  sleep.  Subjective  in-
somniacs may be witnessing sleep whilst failing,
unlike  the  expert  meditators  described  by
Thompson (2015, see especially p. 16), to realize
what it is they are witnessing.
As is the case for white dreams, I am not
suggesting that sleep-state misperception in in-
somnia be equated with dreamless experience,
or indeed that any simple explanation is avail-
able. Clearly, a wide range of conscious mental
activity occurring in sleep might be perceived as
occurring  in  wakefulness,  and  much  of  this
might be quite different from the specific type
of dreamless sleep experience I am interested in
here. And equally clearly, sleep-state mispercep-
tion in insomnia is a far cry from the peaceful
type of sleep experience describe in the Indian
debate. In her book-length treatment of insom-
nia, in which she synthesizes research findings
with her own personal experience of insomnia,
Gayle Greene (2008) describes her reaction to
being told, after a sleepless night in the sleep
laboratory, that she has in fact been asleep: 
So that’s why nobody had come in with a
sleeping pill—the EEG said I was asleep.
But I was not asleep. I was truly awake.
What in the world was it recording? I may
have been in  a state of  deep relaxation,
semi-meditative,  I  usually am when I  lie
there, and I may have dropped off, but I
was aware of all those thoughts, the feel
and look of the room, the long drawn-out
boredom of lying there without a book to
listen to—it felt like consciousness to me.
How  could  I  be  aware  of  all  that  if  I
hadn’t been awake? (Greene 2008, p. 254)
When asked, however, if she had been aware of
the technician coming into her room, she was
not (Greene 2008, p. 253). 
Here, I want only to make room for the
idea that a subgroup of instances of sleep-state
misperception might be more properly described
as resulting from an awareness of what is in fact
sleep, but then is erroneously categorized as be-
longing to wakefulness. And at least a portion
of  this  awareness  of  sleep  might  consist  of
dreamless sleep experience, or the persistence of
temporal  experience  devoid  of  further  inten-
tional content or any specific objects of aware-
ness during sleep. Moreover, this may well be
the dreamless-sleep analogue of prelucid dream-
ing, where heightened awareness of one’s ongo-
ing state leads to its erroneous characterization
as wakeful activity on the level of conceptually
mediated thought. 
Finally,  sleep-state  misperception  of  this
type may not be unique to insomnia, but may
be prevalent in the general population. In a pa-
per aptly titled “The perceptual uncertainty of
having sleep”, Sewitch (1984) describes the out-
come of an experiment investigating the ability
of  healthy  subjects  to  correctly  say  whether
they have been asleep, as determined by object-
ive markers such as EEG measures. She found
that out of 210 awakenings from Stage 2 sleep,
116 were judged to be periods of wakefulness;
for  REM  sleep  awakenings,  the  number  was
lower,  with  45  out  of  165  awakenings  being
judged to have been preceded by a period of
wakefulness.  The surprising  conclusion is  that
even ordinary sleepers quite dramatically under-
estimate  the  amount  of  time  they  have  been
asleep  (see  also  Webb 1975).  Other  studies
point  in  a  different  direction.  There  is  some
evidence that whereas insomnia patients under-
estimate their total sleep time, healthy subjects
overestimate  how long  they  have  been  asleep
(Means et  al. 2003;  Pinto Jr. et  al. 2009).
Clearly,  more  research  is  needed.  But  either
way, it would seem that our confidence in our
ability to tell  whether and how long we have
been asleep or awake is overrated. And perhaps,
at least part of this confusion stems from the
fact that the default view is deeply engrained
not just in cognitive neuroscience, but also in
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folk-psychology: We expect sleep to be a state
of unconsciousness, and so when we recall men-
tal activity that is distinct from dreaming, we
mistakenly think we must have been awake. 
There is, however, an even deeper concep-
tual  point.  The  mismatch  between  subjective
and objective (behavioral or polysomnographic)
markers of sleep should alert us to the fact that
conventional definitions of sleep, and attempts
to operationalize them scientifically, for instance
in the form of sleep-stage scoring systems, may
be  oversimplified.  The  borders  between  sleep
and wakefulness themselves may be fluid. This
brings us back to Thompson’s proposal that a
more  fine-grained  and  phenomenologically  in-
formed taxonomy of sleep states is needed. This
is emphatically illustrated by the following quo-
tation from one of the participants in Sewitch’s
study. This participant had subjective insomnia
and claimed to have been awake following 22
out of 23 Stage 2 NREM sleep awakenings. 
Also, there is for me a state which may be
technically sleep to you, but is wakefulness
to  me  and,  uhh—it’  s  an  intermediate
state—it’ s very hard to define, uhh—but
I definitely felt that it’s there—and uhh—
uhh  none  of  the  questions  precisely  ex-
amined  this  situation.  (Sewitch 1984,  p.
257)
As Thompson suggests, dismantling the default
view may be as simple as asking the right kinds
of questions. 
5.4 Conclusions 
I began this commentary by formulating a num-
ber of related challenges to Thompson’s analysis
of dreamless sleep experience. The first two of
these  centered  on  the  status  of  reports  of
dreamless sleep experience. In order to place the
scientific investigation of dreamless sleep experi-
ence  on  solid  methodological  grounding,  it  is
not enough to establish the logical possibility of
veridical reports of dreamless sleep experience;
rather,  some  rationale  for  distinguishing
veridical  reports  from  nonveridical  ones  is
needed. Also, in order for such reports to be in-
dicative not just of the occurrence of dreamless
sleep experience, but also of its distribution and
quantity across sleep, one will have to assume
such experiences to be reportable. This means
that positive experience reports and reports of
an absence of experience, when gathered under
the same reporting conditions and unless there
is any empirical evidence of disturbing factors,
will  have  to  be  considered  as  equally  trust-
worthy. I responded to these dual challenges by
pointing  out  that  the  methodological  back-
ground  assumptions  upon  which  scientific
dream research has long relied, at least impli-
citly, directly speak to both issues: Dream re-
ports,  at  least  when  gathered  under  (suffi-
ciently)  ideal  reporting  conditions,  are  indeed
assumed to be trustworthy sources of evidence
with respect to the occurrence and phenomenal
character  of  experience  during  sleep  (I  called
this the transparency assumption), and dreams
are also assumed to be assumed to be report-
able experiences (I called this the reportability
assumption). Elsewhere (Windt 2013,  2015),  I
have argued that both assumptions are theoret-
ically justified because they best explain dream
reporting behavior.  Here,  I  only  defended the
more  limited  claim  that  scientific  dream  re-
search  already  offers  the  methodological  re-
sources to turn the study of dreamless sleep ex-
perience into a scientific research program. This
shifts the burden of proof: in order to meaning-
fully challenge the report-based investigation of
dreamless sleep experience, the methodological
background assumptions of scientific dream re-
search will have to be challenged as well. 
An important upshot was that the default
view  is  inconsistent  with  scientific  dream  re-
search.  Due to  its  methodological  background
assumptions,  scientific  dream research is  com-
mitted to the view that if experiences fitting the
profile  of  dreamless  sleep  experience  are,  at
least  occasionally  and  under  sufficiently  ideal
conditions  (for  instance  immediately  after
awakening),  reported  to  occur  in  sleep,  then
dreamless  sleep  experience  exists.  The default
view, understood as an  a priori and conceptu-
ally motivated rejection of dreamless sleep ex-
perience, is flawed. I then argued that by taking
the  analogy  between  contemporary  philosoph-
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ical  and scientific work on dream reports and
the Indian debate seriously, valuable lessons can
be learned in the other direction as well. In par-
ticular, Thompson’s reconstruction and critique
of  the  Nyāya  syllogism  suggests  that  certain
skeptical  objections  to  the  trustworthiness  of
dream reports run into the same problems, res-
ulting either in circularity or an infinite regress.
The second and third parts of my comment-
ary  were  dedicated  to  the  third  challenge  to
Thompson’s view. This was that even if dreamless
sleep  experience  exists,  and  even  if  reports  of
dreamless  sleep  experience  are  taken  to  reflect
this fact, its occurrence in experienced meditators
is too remote to warrant the large-scale revision of
sleep-state taxonomy proposed by Thompson. I
attempted to meet this challenge, first, by first
sketching the outlines of a conceptual framework
for describing dreamless sleep experience. In this
framework, dreamless sleep experience is charac-
terized by pure subjective temporality, or the ex-
perience of duration and of an extended presence
(a stretched phenomenal  now) arising independ-
ently of any further intentional contents, objects
of awareness, or modality-specific imagery. This
model extends existing work on dreams, where I
argue that the simplest forms of dreaming are ex-
amples of minimal phenomenal selfhood, or self-
location  in  a  spatiotemporal  reference  frame
(Windt 2013,  2015). In dreamless sleep experi-
ence, even this minimal form of self-experience is
lost; pure subjective temporality during dreamless
sleep experience is a candidate for minimal phe-
nomenal experience, or the simplest form of phe-
nomenal consciousness. 
In the final part of the commentary, I dis-
cussed what I take to be the most plausible can-
didates  for  dreamless  sleep  experience  in  this
sense:  these  are  lucid  dreamless  sleep,  white
dreams,  and  sleep-state  misperception  as  most
prominently seen in subjective insomnia.  I  also
proposed that these states can be meaningfully
compared to the transition from nonlucid to pre-
lucid and fully lucid dreams. Here, my aim was to
show that dreamless sleep experience is not a re-
mote possibility, but might plausibly turn out to
be a common characteristic of sleep.26 
26 Clearly, this is just the very beginning of the conversation on how to
refine sleep-state taxonomy. Ultimately, the investigation of dream-
Importantly, I am not claiming that the
proposed conceptual  model  is  the final  word
on dreamless sleep experience; it is only a very
first  attempt to delineate the borders of  the
target phenomenon. The model is clearly open
to further conceptual refinement, and I would
like it understood mainly as an invitation to
do so.  What I  would hope,  however,  is  that
the  model  might  facilitate  this  process  by
guiding and informing future research. Simil-
arly,  the  empirical  candidates  for  dreamless
sleep experience that I propose should not be
taken to be exhaustive, and their plausibility
will  depend  on  future  research  findings.  For
now, I hope, however, that they lend further
support and urgency to Thompson’s case for
dreamless sleep experience.
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less sleep experience, and the addition of dreamless sleep experience
to the conceptual tool kit used for the description of sleep and wake-
fulness, may prove to be no more than a first step in this direction.
And while the reconstruction of the Indian debate and its contrast
with contemporary views of sleep is a rich and valuable project, im-
portant but easily forgotten lessons might be found closer to home as
well. The monophasic sleep pattern currently investigated in Western
sleep laboratories and taken to be the biological norm may be only a
few generations old (cf.  Greene 2008, pp. 238-240) and is likely an
artifact of a profound change in sleep behavior brought on, to a con-
siderable extent, by electrical lighting. In preindustrial times, sleep
was biphasic—two periods of sleep, called the first and the second
sleep, were structured around a period of wakefulness that was made
up of quiet rest, perhaps even resembling certain meditative states
and  often  involving  the  contemplation  of  dreams  (Ekirch 2001;
Ekirch 2006). Research suggests that under appropriate conditions—
in an environment without artificial, electrical lighting and without
various nighttime activities that become possible in such an environ-
ment, that compete for our attention and increase the pressure for
and attraction of staying awake rather than going to bed—we natur-
ally return to this biphasic sleep pattern (Wehr 1992). It does not
seem unreasonable to think that the transition to a monophasic sleep
pattern, alongside factors such as increased electrical lighting, traffic
noise, and time constraints—will have changed not just the structure
of sleep, but our experience of sleep as well. With less and less time
allotted to sleep, the temptation to simply black out during sleep (or
to view sleep as involving such a blackout) may have increased; yet,
current sleep behavior in rich, Western societies may be a highly ar-
tificial and learned behavior. If we want a taxonomy of sleep states
to reflect universal features of sleep, rather than our culturally spe-
cific, contemporary sleep habits, we would do well to remember this. 
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